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In recent years, scholars have argued that the last decade of the 20th Century saw 
the emergence of a new type of terrorism distinct from that which the world had suffered 
since 1968. The argument presented in this thesis is that there is no such thing as new 
terrorism. In spite of a few terrorist “spectaculars” in the last decade, the evidence 
suggests that in organizational and ideological terms, terrorism has changed little in the 
last 20 years. The case studies of Al-Qaida and the Lebanese Hezbollah are used to 
support this argument.  
This thesis looks at key scholarly conceptualizations of new terrorism and applies 
these to Al-Qaida and the Lebanese Hezbollah. This study reveals that rather than 
conform to new terrorism, Al-Qaida can be better described as a traditional terrorist 
organization. Key similarities between Al-Qaida and the Lebanese Hezbollah show the 
continuity in international terrorism over the period of the last 20 years. This finding is 
important as the United States government ponders on the best approach in dealing with 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
In recent years, scholars have argued that the last decade of the 20th Century saw 
the emergence of a new type of terrorism distinct from that which the world had suffered 
since 1968. The crux of this thesis is to argue against the emergence of new terrorism. 
This work challenges the idea that a new type of terrorism emerged in the 1990s after the 
fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. After an introduction and 
explanation of the characteristics of new terrorism, the case studies of Al-Qaida and the 
Lebanese Hezbollah are used to support the argument.  
Chapter I looks at the concept of new terrorism. The goal is to introduce the 
phenomenon and to place the issue of international terrorism in the appropriate context 
and perspective before providing the case studies of Al-Qaida and the Lebanese 
Hezbollah (two groups that can be placed at opposite ends of the spectrum with relation 
to traditional and new terrorism). 
 The characteristics associated with the phenomenon of new terrorism are 
introduced. The chapter provides graphical representations of the statistical data on 
international terrorism for the period since 1980 (with a focus on international terrorism 
that targeted the United States). In the development of trends from the statistics events 
and circumstances that fall outside the statistical range and skew the final analysis are 
identified. In this analysis one can see how the apparent increase in the number of 
international terrorist-related casualties is solely associated to Osama bin Laden and his 
Al-Qaida organization. 
 To construct an argument against the emergence of a new type of terrorism this 
thesis relies on the case studies that are introduced in Chapters II and III. In looking at Al-
Qaida in Chapter II, the goal is to show how characteristics of new terrorism do not fit 
the characteristics of Al-Qaida. In looking at Hezbollah in Chapter III, the goal is to show 
that although differences are apparent, the underlying similarities between the two groups 
are significant. There is a difference in intensity (as measured by the number of casualties 
associated with terror attacks), but not in the type of terrorism per se. Indeed, the 
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similarities between Hezbollah and Al-Qaida demonstrate continuity in the type of 
terrorism over the life span of both organizations. 
Chapter II, therefore, examines Al-Qaida. Looking at the ideology and the 
objectives of the organization, the discussion focuses on the driving forces behind the 
movement and the long- and short-term objectives of Al-Qaida. A key point is the 
acknowledgement that Osama bin Laden and his organization approach short-term 
objectives rationally. This rationality stems from a unique perspective that combines 
present geopolitical and geostrategic situations to grander end-states tied to the 
organization’s own interpretation of theological dogma. 
 Additionally, Chapter II analyzes the organizational structure of Al-Qaida.  The 
organization’s structure is that of a transnational organizational design (when looking at 
the organization globally). Al-Qaida also exhibits a hierarchical structure of functional 
divisions at the top echelon of the organizational pyramid. At the lower operational 
echelons of Al-Qaida, the structure is similar to the cellular design commonly associated 
with other terrorist organizations. Chapter II also concentrates on the issue of group 
dynamics and its influence on the effectiveness and success of the group, and on the 
weight that group dynamics can have on the organization’s decision-making process. 
 Furthermore, Chapter II focuses on the issue of Al-Qaida’s external support. 
Spanning from ideological support to the provision of material, manpower, and financial 
resources, the aid that Al-Qaida receives from external sources is the driving force of the 
organization. This section concludes that the concept of state-sponsorship of terrorism as 
an issue of the past is erroneous. Without the support of such states as Sudan and 
Afghanistan, among others, Al-Qaida is hard pressed to continue operations worldwide. 
Also essential, is the aid and support that the organization receives from groups and 
individuals. Although the links between these supporters and Al-Qaida are sometimes 
nebulous and hard to decipher, the networks are present, and indeed, key to the 
continuation of the organization. 
 Additionally, Chapter II discusses the topic of mass casualties in general and the 
use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) weapons by Al-Qaida in 
particular. Al-Qaida believes, from an ideological standpoint, in the rightfulness of 
  xvii
acquiring such non-conventional weapons. Evidence shows that Al-Qaida has pursued, 
and continues to pursue, the acquisition of a CBRN capability. Nevertheless, the use of 
these weapons by Al-Qaida is limited by the need for tacit approval from the 
organization’s constituency. 
The case study of the Lebanese Hezbollah in Chapter III supplies evidence to 
disprove the emergence of new terrorism in the 1990s. This particular chapter shows how 
Hezbollah, in the 1980s, exhibited some important characteristics of new terrorism. More 
important, this chapter demonstrates the similarities that exist between Hezbollah and Al-
Qaida.  
 Chapter III analyzes the ideology and objectives of Hezbollah. It shows how the 
ideology of the group’s leadership was influenced by their common experience in Najaf, 
Iraq. Furthermore, specific events led to the particular ideological zeal of the organization 
that incorporated the ideology of jihad, or holy war, and the concept of martyrdom in the 
defense of what the group perceived to be attacking foreign armies. 
 With relation to the organization’s objectives, Hezbollah’s short-term objectives 
adjusted to the particular geostrategic and/or geopolitical conditions in the region. Much 
in the same manner as Al-Qaida, the long-term objectives were grand and ideologically 
motivated. The short-term objectives, however, were limited to specific conditions in the 
region and in the international scene. 
 Additionally, Chapter III introduces the organizational design of Hezbollah. In its 
infancy, Hezbollah espoused some of the characteristics of new terrorism. In time, 
however, the organizational structure of Hezbollah formed into a clear hierarchy and 
command and control structure. The more mature and effective design of the organization 
resembles the organizational design and command and control structure of Al-Qaida. 
Overall, one can see two organizations that have a centralized decision-making body, but 
decentralize operational decisions to allow for tactical innovation and initiative. 
 Chapter III introduces some of the important sources of external support for 
Hezbollah. State support for Hezbollah was of utmost importance. However, because of 
the dependence on state support, the leadership of Hezbollah sough other sources of 
external aid. Eventually, Hezbollah sought alternate means of support to separate itself 
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from the control and influence of Iran and Syria. In this manner, the leadership of 
Hezbollah could more easily take decisions and actions that suited the organization and 
not an outside power. Hezbollah, therefore, sought after other means of support for the 
purpose of strategic and political survivability. 
 Finally, the case study of Hezbollah illustrates that attacks of mass casualty 
proportions did not begin with new terrorism. As with Al-Qaida, the operations of 
Hezbollah did not seek to achieve mass casualties. Hezbollah chose specific targets for 
particular political and/or strategic reasons. At the same time, though, the organization 
was not limited by the possibility of casualties. Hezbollah used religious motives and 
justifications to maintain operational flexibility. Although not an end in itself, both 
Hezbollah and Al-Qaida were not limited by the possibility of operations resulting in 
mass casualties.  
In sum, there are significant similarities between Hezbollah and Al-Qaida, and 
international terrorism has remained constant throughout the life span of both 
organizations. Therefore, the lessons learned from the attempts to counter Hezbollah 
actions in the 1980s can be applied to the present problem facing by the United States 
with relation to Al-Qaida. The actions that the United States took in the 1980s against 
Hezbollah led to conditions that facilitated further terrorist activity against the United 
States. In addition, the decisions of the U.S. leadership led to a negative perception of the 
United States in the region of the Middle East. Perceptions that only added to the 
continuing fire in the region that was fueled by core problems from where extremism and 
terrorism emerged and expanded. The lessons learned from the actions (or inactions) of 
the United States during the crisis of the 1980s vis-à-vis Hezbollah activities serve as a 
guide in dealing with the present situation with Al-Qaida. 
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I. THE NATURE OF TERRORISM TODAY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years scholars have argued that the last decade of the 20th Century saw 
the emergence of a new type of terrorism (different from the terrorism that afflicted the 
world since 1968).1 This thesis suggests that in fact there is no new terrorism. This thesis 
challenges the idea that a new type of international terrorism emerged in the early 1990s 
after the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. 
To set the background for the arguments that are made in this thesis, this chapter 
first defines terrorism. Second, it describes the concept of new terrorism. The analysis 
identifies the arguments that are made to support the existence of a new type of 
international terrorism and the specific characteristics that are associated with this 
phenomenon. The analysis also includes an introduction and description of specific trends 
that result from statistics on terrorism. 
 Subsequently, this thesis challenges the characteristics of new terrorism in the 
case studies of Al-Qaida and the Hezbollah2 in Chapters II and III, respectively. The case 
study of Al-Qaida shows that most of the characteristics that are commonly associated 
with new terrorism do not apply to an organization that many believe to be the foremost 
new terrorist organization of today. Indeed, this work concludes that in contrasting the 
Lebanese Hezbollah (one of the most successful traditional terrorist organizations) and 
Al-Qaida (the driver behind the terminology of new terrorism), one can see distinctive 
similarities. These similarities show continuity in the type of terrorism over the last 20 
years. Furthermore, as shown in Chapter IV, these similarities suggest that the lessons 
 
1 The year 1968 is generally used as the beginning of modern terrorism with the sustained campaign of 
aircraft hijackings by Palestinian groups [Jeffrey D. Simon, The Terrorist Trap: America’s Experience With 
Terrorism (Burmington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994), pp. 97-98]. The terms terrorism 
and international terrorism are used interchangeably in this work. International terrorism focuses on attacks 
where perpetrators cross national borders, or where targets within a country are of an international nature—
such as diplomatic facilities. 
2 Although there are several Hezbollah groups worldwide, the most notorious and successful is the group 
based in southern Lebanon. When speaking about Hezbollah, therefore, this work refers to the Lebanese 
Hezbollah. 
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learned from the U.S. response to the threat from the Lebanese Hezbollah in the 1980s 
are applicable to the current threat from Al-Qaida. 
B. TERRORISM DEFINED 
 Neither scholars nor practitioners have managed to agree on a single accepted 
definition of terrorism. Counterterrorism efforts worldwide suffer because of definitional 
problems among nations, and even within nations, to agree on an all-encompassing 
definition of terrorism. The difficulty is such that some scholars believe that the search 
for a definition is futile.3 This work, however, combines the definition of terrorism 
provided by the U.S. Department of State with the characteristics stated by Schweitzer.4 
The U.S. Department of State treats as terrorism “any violence perpetrated for political 
reasons by sub-national groups or secret state agents, often directed at noncombatant 
targets, and usually intended to influence an audience.”4 To augment this definition of 
terrorism, characteristics that are associated with terrorism and terrorists are introduced: 
[t]errorism provokes a fear and insecurity deeper than any other form of 
violence, striking innocent victims randomly and without    
warning…terrorists attempt to discredit governments by demonstrating 
their inability to protect their citizens…terrorists use violence in an 
increasingly scattered way to express protest and rage.5 
Five points surface from the definition of terrorism provided above. First, the 
definition applies today in the same manner that it applied twenty years ago. The 
definition itself shows how the phenomenon of terrorism does not change in kind and is 
continuous. Second, terrorism is a struggle for the achievement of political goals. Third, 
 
3 Simon (p. 384) states that definitions of terrorism “lend themselves to contradictions, since they are 
usually influenced by ideological and political perceptions of the terrorist threat.” Simon (p. 384) further 
adds that “since the essence of terrorism is the effect that violent acts can have on various targets and 
audiences, it would make more sense to talk about terrorist-type tactics—which can be utilized by extremist 
groups, guerillas, criminals, or governments.”  
4 Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1998, Department of State Publication 10610, Office of the Secretary of 
State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., April 
1999, p. vi. 
5 Glenn E. Schweitzer with Carole C. Dorsch, Superterrorism: Assassins, Mobsters, and Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (New York and London: Plenum Trade, 1998), p. 32. 
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in terrorism the means that are used to achieve the political goals are of such nature that 
they can be described as severe crimes. Fourth, acts of terror are intended for an audience 
beyond the immediate victims of the act.  Last, terror tactics are usually performed 
against noncombatants.6 
These five points differentiate terrorism from other types of warfare. In addition, 
one more caveat of terrorism further differentiates acts of terror and actions committed by 
legitimate combatant groups. Terrorism occurs outside the bounds of recognized laws, 
rules of warfare, and codes of conduct. Bruce Hoffman states that throughout history 
although national armies have caused much greater death and destruction than “terrorists 
might ever aspire to bring about, there nonetheless is a fundamental qualitative difference 
between the two types of violence…even in war there are rules and accepted norms of 
behavior that prohibit the use of certain types of weapons, proscribe various tactics and 
outlaw attacks on specific categories of targets.”7 Some argue that acts of terror are 
legitimate because of the ultimate objectives that are sought. Terrorist acts, however, tend 
to meet this caveat of actions that fall outside the bounds of civilized rule and commonly 
accepted international law. 
C. TRADITIONAL AND NEW TERRORISM COMPARED  
 This section describes the idea of new terrorism by establishing those 
characteristics that are associated with the concept.  This section also introduces and 
analyzes some of the trends in terrorism that result from the statistics of terror attacks 
gathered in the last 20 years. 
 
6 It is important to keep in mind that the term “noncombatant” is subjective. For example, the October 1983 
attacks on the Multinational Peacekeeping Forces by Lebanese militias were termed acts of terror against 
noncombatants by the United States and France. For the militias, however, the forces were seen as military 
targets. 
7 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 34. The lines here 
between warfare and terrorism are blurred. Many argue against the legitimacy of the strategic bombing 
campaign by the Allied forces over Germany in World War II, or the destruction of the cities of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki with non-conventional weapons. 
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1. New Terrorism 
The concept of new terrorism is based on the idea that the fall of the Soviet Union 
and the end of the Cold War created a situation that intrinsically changed the 
phenomenon of terrorism. The advent of new terrorism paralleled the emergence of 
Osama bin Laden in the international scene. Starting in the early 1990s some scholars 
promptly declared that the world was facing a new and significantly different type of 
terrorism.8  
The characteristics that are associated with new terrorism are summarized in 
Table 1.1 and described below. These characteristics are compiled from the elements 
introduced by Hoffman and Laqueur, among others.9 There are nine characteristics of 
new terrorism that are grouped into three categories—ideology and objectives, 
organizational design, and external support. The sections in the case studies of Chapters 
II and III coincide with these three categories.  
The first grouping of characteristics of new terrorism is ideology and objectives. 
This category has three elements: (1) there is little understanding of the goals and 
objectives of today’s terrorists; (2) the use of terror tactics today is done more as an end 
in itself than as a means in the accomplishment of political objectives; and (3) terrorism 
today seeks to kill rather than to intimidate. The first characteristic is self-explanatory. 
The other two characteristics derive from the connection between religion and terrorism 





8 The first writing on new terrorism can be attributed to Bruce Hoffman, Terrorist Targeting: Tactics, 
Trends, and Potentialities (Santa Monica: RAND, 1992). 
9 Bruce Hoffman, “Foreword: Twenty-First Century Terrorism,” in James M. Smith and William C. 
Thomas (eds.), The Terrorism Threat and U.S. Government Response: Operational and Organizational 
Factors (Colorado: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2001); Brian Jenkins, Ian O. Lesser, 
Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt and Michele Zanini, Countering The New Terrorism (Santa 
Monica: RAND, 1999); Walter Laqueur, “Postmodern Terrorism,” Foreign Affairs, 75:5, 1996, pp. 24-36; 
and Walter Laqueur, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction (New York and 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).  
 
TRADITIONAL TERRORISM  NEW TERRORISM 
Ideology and Objectives 
Clear political objectives Little understanding of their goals and 
objectives 
Terrorism used as a means in the 
achievement of clear goals 
The use of terrorism more as an end in 
itself  
Attacks narrowly focused and limited in the 
number of casualties 
A goal of destruction and mass killings 
fueled by religious apocalyptic concepts 
Organizational Design 
Distinct and clear organizations Amorphous, less distinctive 
organizations 
Localized and limited in operational extent Transnational in nature with no 
sanctuaries 
Clear hierarchy and rigid command and 
control structure 
No clear hierarchy and command and 
control structure 
Centralized decision-making Decentralized decision-making 
Small number of members A larger number of members 
External Support 
Reliance on state-sponsorship Little-to-no state sponsorship 
No involvement with criminal activities Involvement with criminal networks 
 
Table 1.1.   Characteristics of Traditional and New Terrorism 
 
The connection between religion and terrorism is not a concept that is limited to 
new terrorism. In new terrorism, however, religion is coupled with apocalyptic and end-
of-era elements. Some scholars argue that terrorist groups of today, by espousing 
religion, knocked down the barrier of rational thinking that limited the types of terror 
attacks that one could foresee. Without limitations modern terrorist groups are governed 
only by the concept of the total destruction and annihilation of those that they proclaim as 
the enemy. Walter Laqueur, for example, states that 
[a]s human kind approaches the end of the second millennium of the 
Christian era, apocalyptic movements are on the rise. Most of the 
preachers of doom do not advocate violence …Others, however, believe 
that the sooner the reign of the Antichrist is established, the sooner this 
corrupt world will be destroyed and the new heaven and earth foreseen by 
St. John in the Book of Revelation, Nostradamus, and a host of other 
prophets will be realized. Extremist millenarians would like to give history 
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a push, helping create world-ending havoc replete with universal war, 
famine, pestilence, and other scourges.10 
Additionally, Paul Wilkinson comments that “where the perpetrators are 
motivated by religious fanatism this also contributes to the increased propensity for mass-
lethality indiscriminate attacks, because a bomber who believes he is carrying out the will 
of God, or Allah, in waging a ‘Holy War’ or Jihad against an evil enemy is unlikely to be 
inhibited by the prospect of causing large-scale carnage.”11 New terrorist organizations, 
therefore, use acts of terror indiscriminately for the purpose of achieving mass casualties. 
Acts of terror are not carried out to satisfy grander political and/or strategic objectives. 
Actions are taken based on the idea of cleansing and annihilation with a focus on an 
apocalyptic religious ideology. 
The second category of characteristics of new terrorism deals with organizational 
design.  New terrorism has the following organizational characteristics: (1) organizations 
are amorphous and less distinct; (2) groups are transnational in nature and have no 
specific operational sanctuaries; (3) organizations are not hierarchical in nature and have 
a loose command and control structure; (4) organizations have decentralized decision-
making; and (5) terrorist groups are composed of a large number of individuals. 
 The primary argument with regard to organizational design is that new terrorist 
organizations are less hierarchical in nature than traditional ones. The traditional concept 
of a strict command and control structure with “a leader or commander-in-chief at the 
top”12 and a distinct hierarchy from the top to the bottom of the organization is no longer 
valid. Instead, new terrorist organizations are flatter in design and structured along the 
lines of a loose connection of networks. The network structures (some of which are 
described by Arquilla, Ronfeldt, and Zanini)13 are cells simultaneously tied to a central 
node but decentralized in control and execution. The concept of decentralization and lack 
                                                 
10 Laqueur, “Postmodern Terrorism,” p. 32. 
11 Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response (London and Portland: Frank 
Class, 2001), p. 50. 
12 Hoffman, “Foreword: Twenty-First Century Terrorism,” p. v. 
13 John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt and Michele Zanini, “Networks, Netwar, and Information-Age 
Terrorism,” in Brian Jenkins, Ian O. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt and Michele 
Zanini, Countering The New Terrorism (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999). 
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of a formal command and control is pushed further by Stephen Sloan in the concept that 
common loyalties and beliefs provide the glue that holds organizations together. In this 
manner a new terrorist group is viewed as 
[a] small cell-like organization that is not as in the past a combat 
compartmentalized entity that is part of a larger clandestine hierarchy. 
This type of standalone, mini-terrorist group may operate within an 
environment of racial, ethnic, and anti-government hatred, for example, 
but it does not have specific organizational ties to a larger organization, a 
front group or a sector of the community.14  
This new type of organizational design means that decision-making is decentralized to 
the lowest levels of the organization. With no hierarchical command and control 
structure, therefore, terrorist cells are autonomous and operate separate from a central 
command. 
 The third category of new terrorism focuses on external support. The following 
two elements make up this category: (1) new terrorist organizations no longer rely on 
nation states for significant sponsorship; and (2) terrorist organizations of today are 
intrinsically involved with criminal networks worldwide. 
Arguments that support the end of state sponsorship of terrorism center on Al-
Qaida and Aum Shimrikyo. In these two cases it is suggested that individual sponsors of 
terrorism replace state sponsorship. These groups are self-sufficient and have the ability 
to acquire military, financial, and manpower resources without the need to rely on the 
help or aid from nation states.15  
Coupled with the concept of non-state support is the element of support from 
criminal organizations. Bruce Hoffman explains that the lack of reliance on state support 
leads terrorist organizations to look at other fronts for the resources they need to operate 
successfully. “With the lack of bases and lack of patrons, these groups are turning 
increasingly to crime and toward greater involvement with formal criminal links—not 
 
14 Stephen Sloan, “The Changing Nature of Terrorism,” in James M. Smith and William C. Thomas (eds.), 
The Terrorism Threat and U.S. Government Response: Operational and Organizational Factors (Colorado: 
USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2001), p.63. 
15 See Gavin Cameron, “Multi-track Microproliferation: Lessons from Aum Shimrikyo and Al Qaida,” 
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 22, pp. 277-309, 1999. 
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only as a means to raise money to sustain operations but also as a means to increase 
patronage and increase their hold over transnational communities.”16 In contrast to 
traditional state support for terrorist organizations, new terrorist groups have different 
sources of support and do not rely on state support. They are more self-sufficient, they 
receive support from individuals and groups, and new terrorist organizations have links 
with criminal organizations that can provide the needed resources for the sustainment of 
operations. 
2. Trends in Terrorism 
This section now introduces trends in international terrorism evident in data 
collected since the early 1970s.17 Some of the characteristics of new terrorism that are 
mentioned in the previous section are conclusions based on these trends.  
The point is made that the increase in the lethality of international terrorism is not 
a general trend.18 The increase in the lethality of terrorism is a result of the operations 
that are attributed to Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaida organization. An increase in the 
number of casualties associated with Al-Qaida operations, however, does not equate to a 
change in the type of international terrorism. 
This section looks at two issues. First, summarize some of the important trends 
that are associated with international terrorism. Particularly, to concentrate on the trends 
 
16 Hoffman, “Foreword: Twenty-First Century Terrorism,” p. ix. 
17 One should examine statistics on terrorism with a “grain of salt” for several reasons. For one, the 
statistics are based on the past, and therefore, poor indicators of the future. Although trends might show a 
decline in attacks and the lethality of attacks, for example, a single event can negate any previous study. 
Second, the statistics are based on a short view of terrorism, and ignore any trends in the phenomena that 
occurred before the 1970 timeframe. Last, statistics can be manipulated in such a manner that the same data 
can be used to support different arguments. 
18 This notion is also introduced by Ariel Merari, “Terrorism as a Strategy of Struggle: Past and Future,” in 
M. Taylor and John Horgan (eds.), Terrorism and Political Violence: Special Issue on the Future of 
Terrorism, 11 (4), pp. 56-57 in the following excerpt: “The statistics on which the seeming increased threat 
to life trend is based only on international terrorism, whereas most activity is domestic. The number of 
incidents in these statistics is small and therefore easily skewed by single events. The success or failure of a 
single bombing of an airliner can result in a 100 per cent change in the annual statistics of terrorism 
fatalities…Moreover, the ‘trend’ is inconsistent. There are fluctuations from year to year that can only be 
explained by regional or local political developments rather than by universal changes in the nature of 
terrorism…a closer look at the annual changes reveals that throughout the recent decade, for example, there 
were years in which not only the absolute number of fatalities but also the average number of casualties per 
incident dropped markedly. 
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that display the number of international terrorist attacks and the number of casualties. 
Second, take a look at international terrorist attacks that targeted the United States since 
1980. The focus on this last set of statistics is also on the number of attacks and quantity 
of casualties. 
The first set of statistics deals with the phenomenon of international terrorism 
since 1980. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 display the total number of terrorist attacks of an 
international nature and the total number of casualties that resulted from these attacks, 
respectively. Both graphs are based on statistics presented by the U.S. Department of 
State in the yearly released Patterns of Global Terrorism publications. 
There are three essential points to note from Figure 2.1, which depicts the total 
number of international terrorist attacks since 1980. The first is the downward trend in 





















































Figure 2.1.   International Terrorist Attacks (1980-2000)19 
                                                 
19 Patterns of Global Terrorism: 2000, Department of State Publication, Office of the Secretary of State, 













































Figure 2.2.   Total Casualties from International Terrorism (1980-2001)20 
 
highest number of attacks was recorded in 1987 with a total of 666 terrorist incidents, and 
the lowest occurred in 1998 with a total of 274 attacks. Second, one can see a steady 
increment in the number of attacks during the 1980s that is followed by a sharp decrease 
at the end of the decade. The third important trend, one that is also apparent in other 
graphs described below, is the cyclical nature of the graphical depiction. Particularly in 
the 1990s, the trend is for lulls in the number of attacks to be followed by an increase in 
terrorist actions.21  
 Figure 2.2 depicts the total number of casualties caused by international terrorist 
attacks. First, there is a general increase in the number of casualties as depicted by the 
vident in the sharp increase in the number of casualties for linear regression line. This is e                                                 
20 U.S. Department of State Patterns of Global Terrorism: 2000. The number of casualties for 2001 are 
estimated from figures related to the 11 September 2001 attacks (3248 deaths and an estimated twice the 
number of injured). 
21 Note the lull in 1989 with 375 attacks and the spike in 1991 with 565 attacks, and the continuing trend 
with relative quiet periods in 1992, 1994, and 1998 followed by sudden increases in attacks in 1993, 1995, 
and 2000, respectively. 
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1995, 1998 (and 2001). Second, there is a decrease in the number of casualties after 1988 
that lasts into the early 1990s. Last, note the cyclical connotations of the graph that are 
evident in the 1990s where relative lulls are followed by sharp increases in the numbers 
of casualties.  
 One of the principal activities that an analyst should do with statistical 
information is to check for unusual observations that hamper a regression output and 
skew a final graphical analysis of the data.22 Trends can be affected by one or two 
observations that fall outside the norm of the data. By taking out three events that fall 
outside the norm from among thousands of international terrorist incidents per year,23 
Figure 2.3 shows that the number of casualties generated by international terrorism in the 









































Figure 2.3.   Total Number of Casualties (1980-2001) – Without the Computation of Three Al-
Qaida Attacks in 1993, 1998 and 200124 
                                                 
22 William L. Carlson and Betty Thorne, Applied Statistical Methods for Business, Economics, and the 
Social Sciences (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 1997), p. 630. 
239,613 attacks of terror occurred in the 20-year timeframe from 1980 to 2000. 
24U.S. Department of State Patterns of Global Terrorism: 2000. The three events that are not computed are 
the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993 that caused 1,006 casualties, the attacks on the U.S. 
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Three attacks that are attributed to Al-Qaida are withdrawn from the calculation—the 
1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 1998 bombings of the American embassies in 
East Africa, and the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.  
Since the United States is the remaining superpower and the leader of the western 
world, it can be argued that any event of international terrorism affects the United States.  
However, concentrating solely on those attacks that targeted the United States can 
provide a better measure of the direct threat to the United States with regard to 
international terrorism. The following graphical interpretations of the statistics focus on 
the number of attacks and the number of casualties that can be associated with anti-U.S. 
terrorist activities.25 








































Figure 2.4.   Total Terrorist Attacks Against the United States (1980-2000) 26 
                                                                                                                                                 
Embassies in Africa in 1998 that caused 5,378 casualties, and the 9-1-1 attacks that resulted in an estimated 
6500 casualties (3248 deaths and an estimated twice the number of injured). 
25 In the statistics, where able to decipher among individual incidents, this work includes all the casualties 
that resulted from the anti-U.S. attack and not only the American citizens that were casualties. For example, 
although the number of U.S. casualties in the Pan Am 103 incident was 189, the number of total casualties 
in the event—283—was used. 
26 For figures 2.4-2.7 the statistics from 1980 to 1988 were gathered using the comprehensive chronology 
of international terrorism events compiled by Edward F. Mickolus, Todd Sandler, and Jean M. Murdock, 
International Terrorism in the 1980s: A Chronology of Events Volumes I and II (Ames: Iowa State 
  13
 
1980 and 2000. The trend is one of an increase (as shown by the linear regression line) in 
the number of terrorist attacks specifically targeted against the United States. One can see 
a steep increase in anti-U.S. attacks beginning after 1987 and reaching a zenith in 1991 
before decreasing to more “normal” levels in 1994. This trend is the opposite from that 
depicted in Figure 2.1, which showed a general decrease in the total number of 
international terrorist attacks.  
In looking at the data more closely one can see that there are a questionably high 
number of attacks on business related activities in Latin America during the 1990s. 







































Figure 2.5.   Total Number of Anti-US Terrorist Attacks (1980-2000) – Without the 
Computation of the Attacks on the Oil Pipelines in Colombia 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
University Press, 1989). From 1989 to 2000, excluding 1990 and 1994, the data from the U.S. Department 
of State Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1989, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000 
was used. For 1994 this thesis used the data from Bruce Hoffman and Donna Kim Hoffman, The RAND-St 
Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism, 1994 (Santa Monica: RAND, 1997). No data was 
gathered for 1990. Because of the different sources used, and the manner in which they define international 
terrorism and anti-U.S. attacks, it is possible that there are some discrepancies in the statistics. But every 
attempt was made to minimize any discrepancy, and to create a continuous statistical picture. 
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against the multinational oil pipelines in Colombia are not included. This is done for two 
reasons. First, the trends on the overall anti-U.S. terrorism tendencies worldwide are 
skewed when considering the attacks on the oil pipelines. 27 Second, the attacks are a 
result of particular domestic problems facing the Colombian government in a situation 
paramount to a civil war. The attacks are performed to decrease the economic power of 
the Colombian government rather than for specific anti-U.S. considerations. By removing 
this data, the trends reverse and show a general decrease in the number of total anti-U.S. 
terror attacks in the last 20 years. 














































Figure 2.6.   Casualties Resulting from Terrorist Attacks Against the United States (1980-
2001) 
 
                                                 
27 The number of attacks against the multinational oil pipelines since 1988 was as follows: 152 (2000), 77 
(1998), 90 (1997), 45 (1996), 70 (1995), 35 (1993), 50 (1992), 50 (1991), 23 (1989), and 58 (1988). This 
data was gathered from the U.S. Department of State Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1988, 1989, 1991, 
1992, 1993, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, and 2000.  
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the United States. The graph includes non-American casualties that resulted in the anti-
U.S. attack. For example, the attacks on the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania 
resulted in the deaths of 12 U.S. citizens. The graph, however, uses the total number of 
individuals killed in the attack (291) to compute the statistics of those killed in 1998.  
There are three points to gather from this graphical interpretation. First, as 
depicted by the linear regression line, the trend in the last twenty years is of a substantial 
increase in the number of casualties. This is consistent with the previous interpretation of 
the total casualties world wide due to international terrorist attacks. Second, with the 
exception of the spikes depicted for 1993, 1998, and 2001, the number of casualties 
throughout the 20-year timeframe appears to be continuous. Last, the figure shows the 
cyclic component with an effect of repetitious high and low levels over the time period. 
 Trends regarding the concept of terrorism over a 20-year period and involving 
over 2000 events can be skewed by the results of three attacks that provide data with 
unusual observations. This refers to the casualties afflicted in three anti-U.S. terrorist 
attacks—the World Trade Center (WTC) bombing in 1993 (arguably planned and 
executed by Al-Qaida), the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es 
Salaam (planned and executed by Al-Qaida), and the attacks on the WTC and Pentagon 
in 2001 (planned and executed by Al-Qaida). These three events of terrorism skew out of 
perspective the entire spectrum of anti-U.S. terrorist attacks since 1980. 
Figure 2.7, displays a more general picture of the trends in international terrorist 
attacks targeted against the United States in the last two decades. In this graph (that does 
not involve Al-Qaida operations), one can see a decrease in the number of casualties from 
the high levels in the 1980s to more moderate and steady numbers throughout the 1990s. 
Another important trend is the cyclical nature of the graph where years of low casualties 
are followed by a high increase in the casualty levels. 
Four points are gathered from the graphs depicted above. First, the 1980s saw a 
steady increase in the number of international terrorist attacks. This increase was 
followed by a sharp decrease in the number of attacks at the end of the decade that 
coincided with the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. In the 1990s the 
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trend was for a steady decrease in the number of terror attacks. The number of terror 













































Figure 2.7.   Casualties Resulting from Terrorist Attacks Against the United States (1980-
2001) – Without the Computation of Three Al-Qaida Attacks in 1993, 1998 and 
200128 
 
two decades (with the exception of a sharp increase in the number of anti-U.S. terror 
attacks during the 1988-1992 timeframe). It is apparent that the end of the Cold War had 
an affect on terrorism in general. During these first years of instability the United States 
was particularly targeted as the world settled into a new world order. In the 1990s the 
level of attacks normalized to more moderate numbers, as compared to the rest of the 20-
year period. 
 Second, the trends that were displayed contained a cyclical element. This was 
evident in both the representation of the quantity of attacks and the number of casualties. 
The reasons for this pattern could lie in the introduction of counterterrorism measures by 
governments following years of high numbers of incidents and/or casualties. 
Subsequently, the level of attacks subsides and the number of casualties decreases. 
                                                 
28 The three events that are not computed are the bombings of the World Trade Center in 1993, the 
bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Africa in 1998, and the 9-1-1 attacks. 
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Terrorist groups then either use other tactics and/or learn to cope with the 
counterterrorism measures instituted by the governments, and the levels of attacks and 
casualties increase once again.  
Third, the lethality of international terrorism in general, and attacks of terror 
targeted against the United States in particular, over the last 20 years has increased solely 
as a result of the actions of Al-Qaida. The general trend when not involving operations 
attributed to Al-Qaida is one of a decrease in the number of terrorism-related casualties in 
the last decade. Terrorism in general is not more lethal. The lethality in the 1990s is not a 
general trend, but a phenomenon that can be ascribed to Osama bin Laden and his Al-
Qaida organization.  
The increase in the number of casualties from the operations of Al-Qaida, 
however, does not equate to a change in terrorism per se. Although the lethality of Al-
Qaida operations is greater, the characteristics of the organization are similar to the 
characteristics associated with traditional terrorism.  
D. CONCLUSION 
  This chapter took a look at the concept of terrorism. The goal was to introduce the 
concept of new terrorism and to place the issue of international terrorism in the 
appropriate context and perspective before discussing in detail Hezbollah and Al-Qaida 
(two groups that can be placed at opposite sides of the spectrum vis-à-vis traditional and 
new terrorism). 
 This chapter introduced those characteristics that are commonly associated with 
new terrorism. It also provided graphical representations of the statistical data for the 
period since 1980 (with a particular focus on international terrorism that targeted the 
United States). The conclusion was that the general lethality of terrorism, as measured 
from the number of casualties since 1980, decreased. The trend of an increase in the 
lethality of international terrorist attacks was solely attributed to Osama bin Laden and 
his Al-Qaida organization. 
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 The argument against the emergence of a new type of terrorism is not limited to a 
discussion of international terrorist-related casualties. Two case studies are introduced in 
the chapters that follow to establish this argument. In looking at Al-Qaida in Chapter II, 
the goal is to show how characteristics of new terrorism do not necessarily fit this 
organization. In looking at Hezbollah in Chapter III, this thesis introduces the significant 
similarities that are apparent between Al-Qaida and Hezbollah. These similarities display 
continuity in the type of terrorism over the lifespan of the two organizations. 
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II. CASE STUDY: AL-QAIDA29 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 This chapter is a case study of the Al-Qaida organization. The first section looks 
at the ideology and objectives of Al-Qaida.  The second section identifies its 
organization, concentrating on the hierarchy of the group and the command and control 
structure of the organization. This section also analyzes the concept of group dynamics 
and the influence that it has on the organization’s decision-making process. The third 
section analyzes Al-Qaida’s resources and support base. The last section deals with Al-
Qaida’s intent to acquire and use chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) 
weapons. 
 In this case study on Al-Qaida the following arguments are made. First, the 
ideology and objectives of Al-Qaida are known and well established. Furthermore, the 
objectives of Al-Qaida are pragmatic in nature and developed rationally in accordance to 
the group’s perception of reality. Two, the use of terror tactics by Al-Qaida is a means to 
accomplish the organization’s political goals. The use of terror tactics by this 
organization is not an end in itself, or merely used because of an apocalyptic ideology or 
religious zeal. Three, Al-Qaida is not an amorphous organization with little hierarchy. On 
the contrary, Osama bin Laden’s organization has an established hierarchy and a 
centralized command and control structure. Last, state-sponsorship is not a thing of the 
past. Indeed, Al-Qaida was able to grow, and continues to survive, primarily because of 
the support that the organization obtains from nation states. The one organization that is 
commonly associated with the emergence of new terrorism in the 1990s does not meet 
several characteristics of new terrorism. 
 
29 Al-Qaida is the Arabic word for “the base.” Also known by the name Islamic Army or Jihad Base. 
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B. IDEOLOGY AND OBJECTIVES 
 This section focuses on the ideology and objectives of Al-Qaida. This analysis 
introduces three points. First, the ideology and goals of the organization are clear and 
well defined. Second, the objectives of Al-Qaida display rationality. The leadership of the 
organization has a particular perspective of reality and a pragmatic decision-making 
process that leads Al-Qaida to choose specific acts of violence—some of which are 
massive—to accomplish its political goals. Third, although religion and religious 
symbolism are extensively used by the organization, the underlying impetus for the use of 
terror is driven by geostrategic and geopolitical realities. 
1. Ideology 
 The ideology of Al-Qaida is clear. A primary characteristic of new terrorism does 
not apply to this organization.30 Bin Laden—the prime driver behind the compilation of 
the characteristics termed as new terrorism—has expressed his ideology and goals several 
times in an unmistakable manner.31 Al-Qaida’s ideology was developed over time as the 
group adjusted to geopolitical and geostrategic activities. Walter Laqueur’s statement that 
“new terrorism is different in character, aiming not at clearly defined political demands 
but at the destruction of society and the elimination of large sections of the population”32 
is falsified by examining the stated objectives of Al-Qaida. 
 
30 Hoffman, “Foreword: Twenty-First Century Terrorism,” p. v, states that one of the key points when 
comparing traditional and new terrorism is that “…we knew what they [traditional terrorists] wanted. We 
may not have agreed with them. We may have found their aims and objectives heinous, objectionable, 
intolerable, but at the same time, at least we could understand what they were about. We knew what 
motivated them, what their aims were, how they dovetailed their actions to suit their agendas, and we had a 
sense of what they wanted….” 
31 Such as the 1992 fatwa (religious decree) against the presence of U.S. troops in Somalia, the 1995 open 
letter to King Fahd that called for a campaign of guerilla attacks against the U.S., the 1996 statement in the 
Nida’ul Islam magazine where bin Laden stressed the deaths of weaker men, women, and children 
throughout the Muslim world, the 1996 Declaration of War against the US, the 1997 interview with CNN, 
the 1998 interview with ABC News, the 1998 fatwa to kill Americans world-wide, the 1998 declaration of 
the U.S. Army as an enemy of Islam, the 1998 interview with TIME Magazine, the 1999 declaration that all 
U.S. males should be killed, and the 2001 interview with the Arab-based MBC News. 
32 Laqueur, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction, p. 81. 
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 One event is of absolute importance to the ideology of Al-Qaida. The fight of the 
mujahideen—freedom fighters or holy warriors—in Afghanistan during their jihad 33 
against the Soviet Army in the 1980s drove Al-Qaida’s ideology. In a matter of a decade, 
bin Laden managed to become an influential and popular leader within the Arab 
mujahideen. He supported and led the anti-Soviet struggle directly and indirectly in 
several phases of the fighting. It was in Afghanistan in the 1980s that Osama bin Laden 
networked with other influential Muslims in the Middle East to provide the fighters with 
the necessary requirements for a successful jihad. Bin Laden’s time in Afghanistan also 
was important for solidifying his connections with other mujahideen who would later 
become important members in Al-Qaida’s struggle against the United States.  
Three other factors deeply affected the ideology of Al-Qaida. First, the Gulf War 
(1990-1991) and the subsequent presence of American troops in the region were a direct 
cause in the creation of Al-Qaida’s anti-U.S. sentiment. Second, certain conditions in 
Saudi Arabia and the increased influence of the Sunni reform movements in the region 
aided in creating the conditions and support network that led to bin Laden’s militant 
ideology in the 1990s. Last, the foreign policy of the United States provided the fuel for a 
volatile fire that led to the direct clash between the United States and Al-Qaida—the dual 
containment policy in the region of Southwest Asia and the continued perceived 
unlimited support for the State of Israel aided in the creation and sustainment of the 
Osama bin Laden phenomenon and his ideological zeal. 
The references outlining the ideology and objectives of bin Laden are numerous.34 
But one need only look closely at four of them to gain a thorough and complete 
 
33 Jihad can be defined as “Striving. Holy war against non-believers. Sometimes interpreted as the struggle 
against one’s own weakness.” This definition is from Charles Lindholm, The Islamic Middle East: An 
Historical Anthropology (Oxford and Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1996), p. xxii. 
34 See the following: Peter L. Bergen and F. Smyth, “Holy Warrior,” The New Republic, v. 219, 31 August 
1998, pp. 17-19; B. Lewis, “License to Kill: Usama bin Ladin’s Declaration of Jihad,” Foreign Affairs, v. 
77, November/December 1998, pp. 14-19; FAS Military Analysis Network, “Al-Qaida,” 
[http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/ladin.htm], 24 October 2000; Dudley Knox Library, Naval Postgraduate 
School, “Terrorist Group Profiles,” [http://web.nps.navy.mil/~library/tgp/qaida.htm], 15 August 2001; The 
Terrorism Research Center, “Osama bin Ladin,” [http://www.terrorism.com/terrorism/BinLadinTranscript.shtml], 24 
October 2000; Frontline, “Osama bin Laden v. the U.S.: Edicts and Statements,” Public Broadcasting 
Service, [http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/who/edicts.html], 17 July 2001; 
Institute of Counterterrorism, “Al-Qa'ida (the Base),” [http://www.ict.org.il/inter_ter/orgdet.cfm?orgid=74], 
17 July 2001; Nida’Ul Islam, “Mujahid Usamah Bin Ladin Talks Exclusively to ‘NIDA'UL ISLAM’ About 
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understanding of who Osama bin Laden is, what he stands for, and what he views as the 
final end state for his organization.35 The ideology of Al-Qaida is based on a level of 
rationality driven by the group’s particular perception of their religion, the geostrategic 
realities of the world (with particular attention to the region of the Middle East), and the 
organization’s evaluation of the players involved in the conflict.  
 From the onset of Al-Qaida in 1987, bin Laden’s ideology was based on the 
establishment of a group that would fight a jihad outside the confines of Afghanistan. 
This ideology was centered upon the pursuit of a holy war against states that prevented 
the establishment of Islamic governments within their borders. Even at this early stage, 
bin Laden viewed the possible union of all Islamic governments throughout the Muslim 
world under the leadership of a Khalifa.36 This was an idea comparable to the recreation 
of the Muslim empire as it stood 300 years ago37 and with the purity of the first 
Caliphate38 that was established after the death of the Prophet Mohammed.39 
 
The New Powder Keg in The Middle East,” Nida’ul Islam Magazine 
[http://www.islam.org.au/articles/15/LADIN.HTM], 17 July 2001; One of the earliest anti-American statements in 
“Osama bin Ladin,” The Independent [http://menic.utexas.edu/menic/utaustin/course/oilcourse/mail/saudi/0007.html], 17 
July 2001; Yossef Bodansky, Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War On America (Rocklin: Prima 
Publishing, 1999); and Simon Reeve, The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama bin Laden and the Future of 
Terrorism (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1999). 
35 These four essential references are: Osama bin Muhammad bin Laden, The Declaration of War (23 
August 1996); Emergency Net News Service, “Summary/Review of Reports Concerning Threats by Osama 
Bin Laden to Conduct Terrorist Operations Against the United States and/or her Allies - 23 Feb 98 to 16 
Jun 98 (includes original February ‘fatwa’),” [http://www.emergency.com/bladen98.htm], 17 July 2001; 
John Miller, “Talking with Terror’s Banker,” ABC News, 
[http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/world/dailynews/terror_980609.html], 17 July 2001; Federal Bureau 
of Investigation, “The indictment of bin Laden and associates in the bombings of the US embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania,” [http://www.fbi.gov/majcases/eastafrica/summary.htm], 17 July 2001; and the 
transcripts of the trial provided to the author in CD-ROM by FBI Special Agent Daniel Coleman. 
36 Also known as a Caliph – a deputy or ruler of the community of Islam [Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
Southern District of New York Court Reporter’s Office Daily Transcripts of the USA v. Usama bin Laden et 
al trial in the Southern District of New York (Transcript # 126LBIN1, 24 April 2001).] 
37 Muslim lands in 1700 extended as far West as present Morocco and Senegal, throughout the Arabian 
Peninsula and Turkey, as far North as the Caspian Sea, throughout present Iran and South Asia, and as far 
east as Indonesia. See map in Ira M. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies (Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 274. 
38 “The first phase in the construction of the Caliphal regime was the period of the Rashidun in which the 
companions of the Prophet, Abu Bakr (632-34), ‘Umar (634-44), ‘Uthman (644-56), and Ali (656-61), 
ruled by virtue of their personal connection with the Prophet, and the religious and patriarchal authority 
derived from loyalty to Islam. The conquests made the Caliphs the military and administrative chiefs of the 
newly conquered lands. In this role they claimed to be deputies of God.” Quoted from Lapidus, A History 
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 The ideology of reuniting the Muslim world and of returning to the essence of the 
Rashidun Caliphate is not a new concept among the Islamic Fundamentalist mainstream. 
Such a concept has been proposed and advocated by influential Islamic scholars for 
several decades.40 But an ideology that is important when looking at the phenomena of 
Osama bin Laden (not so much for the concept itself, but for his perception of the reality 
of the threat and belief that he can defeat that threat) is the concept of the jihad41 against 
the invading armies of a modern crusade.42 Osama bin Laden believes that the Muslim 
world is currently under the threat of invading Christian and Jewish armies that threaten 
the core and existence of Islam. 
 This ideology became increasingly evident after Osama bin Laden’s fatwa43 that 
was issued on 23 February 1998 where he made public the merger of Al-Qaida and other 
extremist Islamic organizations44 under the banner of the International Islamic Front for 
Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders.  In his proclamation, bin Laden stated that “the 
Arabian Peninsula has never—since God made it flat, created its desert, and encircled it 
with seas—been stormed by any forces like the crusader armies spreading armies in it 
like locusts, eating its riches and wiping out its plantations…all of this is happening at a 
 
of Islamic Societies, pp. 54-55. 
39 Cable News Network, “Video Shows bin Laden urging Muslims To Prepare For Fighting,” 
[http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/Europe/06/21/video.binladen/index.html], 21 June 2001. 
40 See Sayyid Qutb, Milestones (The Mother Mosque Foundation, 1971). 
41 “Unlike many nationalist movements in Algeria, Egypt, Palestine, or even Saudi Arabia, where jihad was 
launched for the good of the homeland, this particular jihad [in Afghanistan] was for Allah and geopolitics. 
The activists saw themselves as Muslim warriors, facing off with the intrusive atheism of the Soviet Union. 
Symbolically, the Soviet Union became atheism and the fight against occupation became a struggle against 
evil. In the process, jihad was semantically transformed; ‘effort’ came to mean ‘violent struggle.’ This 
drastically reduces the flexibility of the term jihad, and thus the doctrine, but it simultaneously unites the 
bloody reality of a protracted, ugly war with a divinely sanctioned fight between good and evil. The shift is 
of awesome importance: Bin Laden perceived the religious-symbolic system of Islam vs. Kufr as the cause 
and motivation behind the conflict in Afghanistan.” Quoted from M. Fandy, Saudi Arabia and the Politics 
of Dissent (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), p. 191. 
42 The “original” crusades became Christian holy wars against Muslims that were supported by the papacy. 
The first crusade with the aim of “liberating” the holy lands in Palestine began in 1095. The last crusades 
were fought throughout the Christian world in protection of their faith from 1305 to 1378. See Robin W. 
Winks, A History of Civilization: Prehistory to 1715 (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall), pp. 173-183. 
43 A fatwa is a legal opinion given by a religious scholar. 
44 The Islamic Jihad, the Egyptian Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, and the Pakistan Ansar, among others. 
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time in which nations are attacking Muslims like people fighting over a plate of food.”45  
The concept of a holy war declared against the people of Islam, and the call for a jihad in 
the defense of their religion is stressed throughout his fatwa. Here Osama bin Laden 
claims that the “crimes and sins” committed by the Americans are a declaration of war on 
Allah, his messenger (Mohammed), and Muslims. Bin Laden pinpoints that the obligation 
is upon the people of Islam to defend the religion, stressing that “…as for the fighting to 
repulse, it is aimed at defending sanctity and religion, and it is a duty as agreed…nothing 
is more sacred than belief except repulsing an enemy who is attacking religion and 
life.”46 These elements become central to the ideology of defense against crusades that 
are aimed at the displacement and destruction of Islam. These concepts drive the idea of a 
jihad by the oppressed against the oppressors, and they aid in laying down an ideology 
and theological framework that form the basis for the development of the objectives of 
Al-Qaida. 
2. Objectives 
 From the long-term perspective, bin Laden has from the outset espoused the idea 
of a return to the puritan concept of a Rashidun Caliphate and the establishment of 
Islamic governments throughout Muslim lands. But the short-term objectives are 
pragmatic in nature, rationally developed, and formulated within Al-Qaida’s perceived 
realities of the world and the particular situation in the specific region of concern. The 
objectives of Al-Qaida show an awareness of regional and global issues, and “especially 
how changes in each of these environments affects the situation of Muslims in diverse 
political, geographical, and operational contexts.”47 Bin Laden’s short-term objectives 
tend to adjust as the situation changes, and in response to the actions of those that he 
perceives to be a threat to his organization.48 
 
45 Emergency Net News Service, paragraph 6. 
46 Ibid., paragraph 14. 
47 Magnus Ranstorp, “Interpreting the Broader Context and Meaning of Bin Laden’s Fatwa,” Studies in 
Conflict and Terrorism, 21 June 1998, pp. 323. 
48 One should only look at the most recent Osama bin Laden appearance to ascertain this point. This 
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 In 1987, at the beginning of Al-Qaida, Arabs fighting along side the Afghan 
mujahideen were closing down on the goal of expelling the Soviet Union from 
Afghanistan. The short-term objective of bin Laden at this time, in conjunction with two 
partners—Abu Hafs and Abu Abaida49—was to create an organization to gather, unite, 
and guide the Arab mujahideen in the goal of fighting the Soviet invasion forces.50 Anti-
American fervor was already in existence at this early stage, but the first goal of Al-Qaida 
dealt directly with the geostrategic circumstances and realities of the situation in 
Afghanistan in the late 1980s.51 
 A defining factor in the development of Al-Qaida occurred in 1990 with the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait and the consequent intervention of mostly western forces led by the 
United States. It is important to view this occurrence and the resultant changes in the 
objectives of bin Laden, however, within the context of three other events that 
exacerbated the conditions and ultimately led to the targeted anti-American sentiment. 
The first was the manner in which the Arab mujahideen were treated upon their return to 
their respective countries once the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan subsided 
and the need for these fighters ended. In many countries facing an upsurge of Islamic 
militant sentiment in the early 1990s (such as Egypt and Algeria), these battle-hardened 
holy warriors were treated as criminals, persecuted upon their arrival, or not allowed to 
return.52 In many ways, this was exemplified in the manner that the Saudi Arabian 
 
appearance was a recorded message that was displayed after the U.S. military campaign against the Taliban 
government in Afghanistan began on October 2001. In the message, Osama bin Laden made mention of the 
issue in Kashmir. The topic of Kashmir is something that he had never previously mentioned. But 
understanding the centrality of Pakistan’s role in the U.S.-led coalition, and the problematic situation of the 
Pakistani leadership in relation to Islamic movements in the region, the issue of Kashmir was harped upon 
for strategic reasons.   
49 At this point in time Osama bin Laden was less influential and responsible in the creation of Al-Qaida 
than Abu Hafs and Abu Abaida. 
50 Even as recent as 1990 and early 1991 members joining Al-Qaida took an oath to the organization in 
defense of Islam with the Russians and communism in mind. See Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
Transcripts # 14O1BINF and 12F1BINF. 
51 After the defeat of the Soviets, Al-Qaida began to pursue other goals. First, the organization began to 
help the anti-communist forces in Yemen fighting a civil war. Also evident was help that Al-Qaida began 
to provide anti-communist forces within Afghanistan in the early 1990s after the Soviets were defeated. 
52 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Transcript # 12E1BINF. 
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government dealt with Osama bin Laden upon his return to Saudi Arabia and in his 
efforts to use the Arab mujahideen in protecting the country from a possible Iraqi 
invasion.53 The denial of recognition for years of jihad against the Soviet forces in 
Afghanistan had a negative affect in the view of these Arab mujahideen vis-à-vis some of 
the Arab nations (particularly, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Algeria) and galvanized a 
sentiment that was nurtured by bin Laden for years to come.  
The second exacerbating factor developed in the early 1990s as the displaced and 
angered Arab mujahideen began to unite under the leadership of bin Laden in Sudan. At 
this time, the newly established National Islamic Front (NIF) government in Sudan 
opened its borders to all Muslims. In the early 1990s, the NIF attempted to consolidate its 
position within the country with the ultimate desire to expand Islam toward the Great 
Lakes and the Horn of Africa.54 In Sudan Al-Qaida developed and matured. The 
leadership of Al-Qaida launched numerous businesses that were used as front 
organizations in support of the more militant activities of the group. Furthermore, a third 
exacerbating element was tied to the Sudanese factor. Sudan’s neighbor—Somalia—
became the place where bin Laden began to actively pursue his offense against the 
western powers in general and the United States in particular. 
 
53 For Osama bin Laden the threat from Saddam Hussein to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia was something that 
he predicted soon after his arrival from Afghanistan at the end of the 1980s. Bin Laden preached the 
possibility of an Iraqi invasion from what he believed to be the corrupt and deeply non-Islamic regime of 
Saddam Hussein (Bodansky, p. 29). In the late 1980s the Saudi leadership backed the regime of Hussein 
against Iran, which they considered to be the best of two evils, and the Saudi leadership, therefore, 
attempted to keep bin Laden’s proclamations in check (Bodansky, p. 29). When Iraq moved into Kuwait in 
the summer of 1990 and threatened to continue south toward Saudi Arabia, bin Laden immediately planned 
for a contingent composed of his experienced and battle hardened mujahideen that could repel the possible 
Iraqi threat. In the days following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait “the young militant [bin Laden] barged into 
Saudi defense ministry offices with maps and flowcharts to demonstrate how the kingdom could defend 
itself against Iraqi aggression.” (Reeve, p. 171) Bin Laden was directly ignored by a regime that he was 
beginning to see as ineffective, corrupt, and unappreciative of the efforts and sacrifices that he (and the 
mujahideen) endured during a better part of the 1980s. In turn, the Saudi regime began to see bin Laden as 
more of a problem and detriment, rather than an asset and a hero as he was viewed early upon his arrival 
from South Asia. This break in the relationship between the Saudi regime and Osama bin Laden had an 
important impact in the events of the 1990s, and his actions against the United States and its allies in the 
Middle East. 
54 F. Smyth, “Culture Clash – Bin Laden, Khartoum and the War Against the West,” Jane’s Intelligence 
Review, v. 010, 1 October 1998, p. 22. 
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A United States-led coalition under the name Operation Restore Hope55 entered 
Somalia in December 1992. This coalition had a mandate from the United Nations (UN) 
to provide protection to humanitarian and other peacekeeping operations and to continue 
the work of UNISOM I that was established in April 1992.56 For Osama bin Laden and 
his followers, however, the western-led operation57 was a sign of the continuation and 
expansion of a western crusade. Bin Laden saw the peacekeeping forces in Somalia as a 
prolongation and extension of the situation in the Arabian Peninsula with western 
military involvement in Muslim lands. From Sudan, bin Laden issued one of his earliest 
anti-American fatwas calling the UN and United States involvement in Somalia a pretext 
to a future invasion of the Sudan and Africa.58 
 Hence, one can see a transformation in the early 1990s in the objectives of Al-
Qaida from a focus in the original fight against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan to a 
conflict against the United States. Some specific factors augmented the displeasure of 
having western troops in the Arabian Peninsula and created the impetus to the 1996 fatwa 
by bin Laden that called on a war against the United States. 
 Osama bin Laden’s Declaration of War was made public on 23 August 1996.  
This declaration, in conjunction with the fatwa that was issued on 23 February 1998, 
provided a complete insight into the objectives of Al-Qaida. Under the banner of defense 
against a “Zionist-Crusader” alliance, the declaration of war and the 1998 fatwa 
ints that led to specific objectives. One, and arguably the  
55 See United Nations, “United Nations Operation in Somalia II-UNOSOM II,” 
[http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unosom2.htm], 17 July 2001, for information on the 
overall United Nations Operation (UNISOM II). See United Nations, “United Nations Operation in 
Somalia I-UNOSOM I,” [http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unosomi.htm], 17 July 2001, for 
details regarding Operation Restore Hope. 
56 United Nations, “United Nations Operation in Somalia II-UNOSOM II.” 
57 According to United Nations, “United Nations Operation in Somalia I-UNOSOM I,” the operation 
included personnel from several western and non-western nations: Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, 
Botswana, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Kuwait, Malaysia, 
Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Romania, Saudi Arabia, 
Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United States, and Zimbabwe. 
58 According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Transcript # 14NLBINF, in Somalia and in the 
Arabian Peninsula at the time of the U.S. involvement in Restore Hope one can see the first operations that 
can allegedly be tied to Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaida. Bin Laden acknowledged that he was responsible 
for the botched operation that was conducted by U.S. Army Rangers and Special Forces in Mogadishu on 
October 1993. 
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primary, the continuing American “occupation” of the land of the two holy places—
Saudi Arabia. In the fatwa that was proclaimed in 1998, bin Laden wrote: “for more than 
seven years the United States is occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of its 
territories, Arabia, plundering the riches, overwhelming its rulers, humiliating its people, 
threatening its neighbors, and using its bases in the peninsula as a spearhead to fight 
against the neighboring Islamic peoples.”59  
 The second and third main points dealt with the “spilling of Muslim blood” in 
Palestine and Iraq. Referring to the situation in Palestine, the 1998 religious decree by bin 
Laden stated that although the war and the occupation of the Arabian Peninsula was done 
for religious and economic purposes, they were also done to “serve the petty state of the 
Jews, to divert attention from their occupation of Jerusalem and their killing of Muslims 
in it.”60  Last, in both the Declaration of War and the fatwa that bin Laden proclaimed in 
1998, there was stress placed upon the plight of the Iraqi people. The 1998 fatwa stated 
that 
[d]espite the immense destruction inflicted on the Iraqi people at the hands 
of the Crusader-Jewish alliance and in spite of the appalling number of 
dead, exceeding a million, the Americans, in spite of all of this, are trying 
once more to repeat this dreadful slaughter. It seems like the long 
blockade following after a fierce war, the dismemberment and the 
destruction are not enough for them. So they come again and destroy what 
remains of these people and to humiliate their Muslim neighbors.61 
 
In the 1996 declaration of war, emphasis was placed on the number of children that had 
allegedly died in Iraq as a result of the United States-led sanctions against the country.  
Bin Laden in this matter stated that “more than 600,000 Iraqi children have died due to 
lack of food and medicine and as a result of the unjustifiable aggression (sanction) 
imposed on Iraq and its nation…the children of Iraq are our children…you, the USA, 
together with the Saudi regime are responsible for the shedding of the blood of these 
innocent children.”62 
 
59 Lewis, p. 15. 
60 Ibid., p. 16 
61 Ibid., p. 17 
62 Bin Laden, The Declaration of War, p. 10. 
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From these main points emerge the current short-term objectives of Al-Qaida. 
They are rational and embedded in the current geopolitical and geostrategic realities (or 
the organization’s perception of these realities). For Al-Qaida the targeting of the United 
States will continue until the following goals are accomplished: (1) absolutely no United 
States presence in the Arabian Peninsula; (2) discontinuation of support for those nations 
perceived as enemies of Islam (i.e. Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, Algeria, Russia, 
India, Philippines); and (3) cessation of any influence preventing Muslims from 
establishing governments based on Islamic Shari’a63 world-wide.64 
C. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
 This section identifies the hierarchy and command and control structure of Al-
Qaida. It focuses on the structure of the group at the higher echelons to the creation of 
operational cells at the lower end of the organizational pyramid. It then explores group 
dynamics and decision-making within the group.  
Three key points emerge in this section. One, Al-Qaida has a hierarchy with and 
strong command and control influence from the organization’s leadership echelon. Two, 
the structure of the operational cells at the lower end of the hierarchical pyramid are 
analogous to cell formations that have been evident in multiple other terrorist 
organizations for several decades. Three, in Al-Qaida operational decision-making is 
centralized, while execution of tactical missions is decentralized. Consequently, this 
discussion challenges the characteristics of new terrorism that describe terrorist 
organizations as flat, amorphous, and lacking an established command and control 
hierarchy. 
 
63 According to Lindholm, p. xxvi, Shari’a signifies the ‘path’—the total corpus of Muslim Law.   
64 These goals are those perceived by former Al-Qaida members and operators as mentioned in the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, Transcript # 137LBIN1, 2001. It can be suggested that a fourth goal is the 
termination of all economic and political sanctions against Muslim countries in the Middle East—Libya, 
Syria, Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan. 
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1. Organizational Design 
 More than a mere network of autonomous operational cells, the transnational 
model of organizational structure can be applied to Al-Qaida. The underlying reason for 
establishing a transnational model is to exploit global and local business advantages 
while benefiting from technology, innovation, and functional control. The transnational 
model can be explained as follows: 
Achieving coordination, a sense of participation and involvement by 
subsidiaries, and sharing of information, new technologies, and customers 
requires a complex and multidimensional form of structure. The 
transnational model is much more than just an organizational chart. It is a 
state of mind, a set of values, a shared desire to make a worldwide system 
work, and an idealized organization structure for effectively managing 
such a system. The following characteristics distinguish it…(1) …operates 
on a principle of ‘flexible centralization.’ A transnational may centralize 
some functions in one country, some in other, yet decentralize still other 
functions among its many geographically dispersed operations; (2) 
subsidiary managers initiate strategy and innovations that become strategy 
for the corporation as a whole…managers at all levels in any country have 
authority to develop creative responses and initiate programs in response 
to emerging local trends, then disperse their innovations worldwide; (3) 
unification and coordination are achieved through corporate culture, 
shared vision and values, and management style rather than through 
vertical hierarchy; [and] (4) alliances are established with other company 
parts and with other companies.65 
 
This model does not negate a strong central leadership or a hierarchy, but it decentralizes 
operational execution and provides for flexibility and innovation at the lower echelons of 
the organization. Hierarchy and command and control are not annulled. Instead, a 
different approach is used to better manage and control the organization.  
Figure 3.1 depicts the transnational nature of Al-Qaida and its organizational 
structure. Note the centrality of Afghanistan in the structure of the organization. The 
 
65 Richard L. Daft, Organization Theory and Design (Cincinnati: South-Western College Publishing, 1998) 
pp. 269-270. 
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figure shows the importance that Afghanistan holds as the central component of the 
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Figure 3.1.   Organizational Structure of Al-Qaida 
 
 
                                                 
66 The centrality of Afghanistan is something that is currently questionable as the Taliban regime of the 
country was ousted from power by the U.S.-led coalition. 
  32
                                                
A second key point is the obvious global scope of the organization. But although 
there are operational cells spread worldwide, there are only a handful of countries that 
one can consider as significant hubs of support. Some nations like the United States, the 
United Kingdom and Germany become important hubs because of their liberal 
democratic nature, their large population of Muslims, and the readily available 
technology and means of communication. Other hubs, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, 
Algeria, Pakistan, Philippines, and Lebanon are important because of the number, 
experience, and influence of militant Islamic groups and networks within their borders. 
Also evident in Figure 3.1 are the states where it is believed that the government, or at 
least higher echelons of the government, provides direct support to the organization. An 
important aspect of Figure 3.1 is that state support plays a leading role in the overall 
transnational structure of bin Laden’s organization. 
At the top of the organization the leadership of Al-Qaida is separated into 
functional divisions as represented in Figure 3.2. This represents a traditional hierarchical 
model. Osama bin Laden (the emir) is at the top of the organization surrounded by a 
majlis al shura—a governing council composed of 31 members.67 This council is central 
to the decision-making process of the organization. Indeed, organizational decisions are 
made by the majlis al-shura and not by a single individual.68 Under the emir and the 
shura council, there are five committees responsible for the functional aspects of Al-
Qaida—the military, money and business, fatwa, Islamic study, and media reporting 
committees.69 At this level of the organization, it is believed that the members of Al-
Qaida have full knowledge of the immediate goals and operations of the rest of the 
 
67 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Transcript # 12DLBINF. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Note from figure 3.2 that several of the leaders of the committees are also members of the majlis al shura 
(Federal Bureau of Investigation, Transcript # 126LBIN1). Also note that some changes to the members of 
the military committee occurred in November 2001, with the reported death of Mohammed Atef (the 
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Figure 3.2.   Organizational Structure of Al-Qaida’s leadership Echelon 
   
organization.70 Outside the inner circle, at the lower echelons of a pyramid structure, the 
knowledge of overall activities diminishes. At the lowest level, cells operate in much the 
same manner as terrorist cells have operated for decades—driven by the need for secrecy 
and specific operational requirements.71  
The following analysis of the operational phases of a typical Al-Qaida operation 
supports the centrality of the leadership of Al-Qaida in the decision-making process. Al-
                                                 
70 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Transcript # 12DLBINF. 
71 Martha Crenshaw, “An Organizational Approach to the Analysis of Political Terrorism,” Orbis, 29:3, 
Fall 1985, p. 469, states that a dominant organizational design in terrorist groups is the cellular structure “in 
which decisions are made at the top of the pyramid and communicated downward to subordinate but 
compartmentalized units, with only the top echelon having any knowledge” of the overall mission. 
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Qaida operations are generally separated in four phases.72 The first phase deals with the 
collection of information on the place, time, type of target, and the means that are 
required to accomplish the mission. In the second phase, the leadership of the 
organization decides on whether or not to pursue the particular mission. At this point the 
shura council decides whether the tactical operation meets the overall objectives of the 
institution. Once the decision is made to continue the operation, the third phase is 
initiated to ensure that all the operational requirements and the logistic needs are gathered 
in support of the tactical endeavor. The last phase of the operation is the actual attack and 
is the place where all the cell members gather and attempt the tactical mission.73  
 Except for the second phase of the mission, where the primary decision is made to 
continue or halt the operation, operational cells are autonomous in the preparation and 
accomplishment of their mission. Using the example of the 1998 American Embassy 
bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, Al-Qaida operational cells are composed of four 
sections—an intelligence section, an administrative section, a planning and preparation 
section, and an execution section.74 The leader of the intelligence section is normally the 
head of the overall cell planning and executing the operation. This cell leader is normally 
not someone who “pulls the trigger” at the latter part of the tactical execution. Also, 
several members of the cell are on a “need-to-know basis” for operational security 
reasons. Particularly in attacks that are coordinated and simultaneous, it is likely that 
operators have no knowledge of other members, or even of other attacks that are planned 
as part of the overall operation.75 
 The question surfaces of the influence and direct management that Al-Qaida 
leaders—Osama bin Laden and the majlis al-shura—have over the tactical operations. 
There are two possible answers to this question. One is that autonomous cells driven by 
the call of Al-Qaida’s ideology decide and execute their own operations. Al-Qaida’s 
leadership only remotely influences these self-governing cells, and the cells can tap into 
 
72 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Transcript # 12LKBINF. 
73 As in the case of the 1998 attacks in Kenya and Tanzania, the period of time from the initial phase to the 
accomplishment of the operation is measured in years. 
74 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Transcript # 137LBIN1. 
75 Ibid. 
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the grander organizational network for logistic, intelligence, financial, or other support.76 
The second, more realistic answer, is that Al-Qaida’s leadership does have a direct role in 
the operations that are carried out. This is deduced from the statement that was made by 
one of the government’s key witnesses during the bombing trial of the United States 
Embassies in Africa:  
Osama bin Laden is at the very top of Al-Qaida but that he has several 
military leaders directly under him, and that bin Laden provides the 
political objectives to these military leaders or these senior leaders, and 
that these people would then provide the instructions down, down lower to 
the lower chains of command…it wouldn’t be normal for bin Laden to 
directly give instructions to someone like Azzam [member of operations 
cell in Kenya].77 




76 Interview between Kenneth Campbell, Office of Counterterrorism Analysis, Defense Intelligence 
Agency, Washington, D.C., and the author, 21 August 2001. 
77 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Transcript # 137LBIN1. 
78 The analogy to the military here is that of a division commander providing general guidance and support 
for actual operations that are conducted by more junior commanders at the lower levels of the chain of 
command. This analogy was provided in an interview between Thomas Kuster, Director, Counterterrorism 
Policy, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., and the author, 20 August 2001. 
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2. The Organizational Perspective to Group Behavior79 
This section relies on the organizational perspective developed by Martha 
Crenshaw to arrive at an understanding of Al-Qaida as an institution. Martha Crenshaw 
explains that 
the analysis suggests that acts of terrorism may be motivated by the 
imperative of organizational survival or the requirements of competition 
with rival terrorist groups. Terrorism is the outcome of the internal 
dynamics of the organization, a decision-making process that links 
collectively held values and goals to perceptions of the environment. 
These organizational factors are especially useful in explaining how 
terrorist behavior can become self-sustaining regardless of objective 
success or failure and of changing conditions.80 
Decision-making within Al-Qaida appears to be influenced by the group dynamics of the 
organization.  
The focus on the group dynamics of Al-Qaida is driven by this work’s goal to 
assess the idea that new terrorist organizations choose acts of terror or escalate the acts of 
violence merely because of religious and/or apocalyptic reasons.81 A group dynamics 
analysis of Al-Qaida shows that the increase in the lethality and the scope of operations 
executed by the organization has more to do with internal conflict and organizational 
approach elements than with religious concepts. 
 Survivability of an organization is closely tied to the incentives that are provided 
by the leadership to the members of the group. Martha Crenshaw explains that although 
 
79 Two approaches are commonly held to explain the behavior of terrorist groups: the Instrumental 
Perspective and the Organizational Approach. This section concentrates on the latter of the two 
perspectives. The organizational approach is characterized by the following assumptions: “(1) The act of 
terrorism is the outcome of internal group dynamics; (2) individual members of an organization disagree 
over ends and means; (3) the resort to terrorism reflects the incentives leaders provide for followers and 
competition with rivals; (4) the motivations for participation in terrorism include personal need as much as 
ideological goals; (5) terrorist actions often appear inconsistent, erratic, and unpredictable; (6) external 
pressure may strengthen group cohesion; rewards may create incentives to leave the group; (7) terrorism 
fails when the organization disintegrates; achieving long-term goals may not be desirable.” Quoted from 
Martha Crenshaw, “Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches,” in David C, 
Rapoport (ed.), Inside Terrorist Organizations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), p. 26. 
80 Crenshaw, “An Organizational Approach to the Analysis of Political Terrorism,” p. 473. 
81 See Hoffman, “Foreword: Twenty-First Century Terrorism;” Laqueur, “Postmodern Terrorism”; and 
Laqueur, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction. 
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ideology plays a key role in the organization’s establishment and maintenance, individual 
members rarely join and remain in an organization solely motivated by ideological 
commitment.82 Incentives for recruitment and retention are essential and the leadership of 
the organization “maintains their position by supplying various tangible and intangible 
incentives to members, rewards that may enhance or diminish the pursuit of the 
organization’s public ends.”83 Al-Qaida recruits and maintains members in the 
organization through a mix of ideological measures and quantitative incentives. Indeed, 
as mentioned below, the failure of the leadership to provide adequate incentives to some 
of the members equated to organizational setbacks. 
 Attraction to Al-Qaida is influenced by the significant ideological connotations 
and religious symbolism of the group. Some members of the group stated that there was 
attraction to Al-Qaida because it represented the Muslim community in general rather 
than a specific group of people or ethnicity.84 Many of the members believed that the 
leadership would make decisions that were correct in the view of Islam.85 From the 
outset, however, the leadership understood that ideology itself could not be the lone glue 
holding the institution together. Veiled in secrecy, future members were informed of the 
underlying objective of jihad and sworn (by taking a bayat)86 to the organization to 
follow, without question, the rules of Al-Qaida and all the fatwas proclaimed by the 
leadership of the group.87 Any deviance from full compliance and obedience to the group 
would be met with reprisal. For example, in 1997 the organization believed that an 
important member of Al-Qaida—Abu Fahdl al Makkee, who was a key member of the 
money and business committee—was aiding the United States government. In that 
 
82 Crenshaw, p. 471. 
83 Crenshaw, “Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches,” p. 19. 
84 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Transcript # 12RLBINF. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Bayat means a sworn alliance to the group and its leaders. Bayat was actually a pledge taken by the 
followers of Mohammed. It is usually given to the head of an Islamic state or the Khalifa—he leader of the 
Muslim community. The bayat also establishes a pledge from the leader to the people in providing for their 
needs. Information on bayat is provided in Federal Bureau of Investigation, Transcript # 1401BINF, 2001. 
87 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Transcript # 126LBIN1. 
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instance, it became widely understood that the organization would seek out and kill 
anyone suspected of being an informant against the group.88  
 Dissatisfaction with the tangible incentives provided to Al-Qaida members 
showed the limitation of a solely ideological means for the retention of personnel and for 
keeping the organization together. Problems for Al-Qaida emerged in 1994-1995 when 
the organization started to have financial problems, and the salaries of some Al-Qaida 
members were significantly reduced.89 These financial problems uncovered inequities in 
salaries between members. Egyptians in the organization were provided the highest 
amounts and there were tendencies for non-Egyptian members of the group to be treated 
as second-class citizens.90 This inequality in the tangible incentives provided to the 
members of the organization led a prominent member of Al-Qaida—Jamel Ahmed Al-
Fadl (a.k.a. Abu Bakr Sudani)—to steal $110,000 from the organization and ultimately 
turn himself to the American authorities.91 This was an example of a highly ideological 
group failing to maintain faithfulness in important members of the organization because 
of the leadership’s failure to provide and manage tangible incentives. 
 Internal conflict is another aspect of group dynamics that is important to consider 
when looking at Osama bin Laden’s organization. Group dynamics and disagreements 
about particular operations and tactical means have had, and continue to have, a key 
influence on the decision-making process of the organization. The increase in the 
lethality of the attacks that Al-Qaida has performed and/or supported in the last ten years 
is a result of internal conflict within the organization. Taking into consideration the high 
price of exiting Al-Qaida—from possible direct targeting by the organization to 
persecution by foreign governments—the following statement by Martha Crenshaw is 
applicable to the analysis of bin Laden’s group: 
 
88 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Transcript # 151LBIN1. 
89 According to the trial transcripts of the American Embassy bombings in Africa, informants stated that Al-
Qaida members—when the organization was in Sudan—were earning up to $1200 per month on top of 
their normal salaries earned from genuine business practices ran by the organization. Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, Transcript # 126LBIN1. 
90 B. Weiser, “Trial Poked Holes in Image of Bin Laden’s Terrorist Group,” The New York Times, 
[http://nytimes.com/2001/05/31/world/31TERR.html], 31 May 2001. 
91 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Transcript # 127KBINF. 
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The dissatisfied terrorist may prefer changing the organization’s political 
direction to departing in frustration. This effort may lead to ‘creative 
innovation’ under pressure. The combinations of high barrier of exit and 
dissatisfaction may thus encourage more violence. When members of a 
terrorist group lack the possibility of exit and are intensely loyal, the 
failure to achieve the organization’s stated purpose may only make them 
strive harder.92 
Dissatisfaction within the organization—a split in the ideology and overall 
direction of the organization—first happened in Al-Qaida in the early 1990s. The first 
ideological split came in 1993-1994 when members of the organization began to question 
operational decisions that would lead to the death of innocent civilians. At the time of the 
split those leaders calling for a more extreme and wide definition of what the tactical 
targets could be (to include civilians) were on the losing end of the argument.93 Another 
split occurred in 1993 when the blind Muslim preacher Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman94 
was arrested for involvement in a conspiracy to destroy the towers of the World Trade 
Center and other attacks in New York City in 1993.95 The Egyptian members of Al-
Qaida, who had considerable influence within the organization, wanted to immediately 
retaliate against the United States for the imprisonment of their religious leader.96 In this 
particular case, the majlis al shura sided with Osama bin Laden who did not seek the 
retaliation that the Egyptian members demanded. This particular split was important, not 
only because of the significant influence of the Egyptian contingency in Al-Qaida, but 
because of the proven tendency of Egyptian Islamic militant groups to attempt mass 
killings of civilian targets to achieve their organizational goals.97  
 
92 Crenshaw, p. 24. 
93 In this example the Egyptian members of Al-Qaida were calling for more extreme measures, while the 
other members of the group (including bin Laden) espoused a less extreme view. See Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, Transcript # 12KKBIN1. 
94 Sheikh Omar was the spiritual leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad Group. 
95 Reeve, p. 60. 
96 The members of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad wanted to attack the American Embassy in Riyadh and 
several within Al-Qaida questioned the act of targeting a building that would lead to civilian and Muslim 
casualties. See Federal Bureau of Investigation, Transcript # 12KKBIN1. 
97 The Gamaa Islamiya (Egyptian Islamic Group) carried out the bloodiest attack in Egyptian history on 17 
November 1997 with the slaughter of 58 tourists at the Valley of the Kings near Luxor. See K. Whitelaw, 
“Bin Laden Network,” U.S. News & World Report, v. 125, 31 August 1998, p.51. 
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The influential Egyptian element within the organization remained part of Al-
Qaida after significant splits over strategy. Subsequently, the Egyptian contingent began 
to fight from within the organization to influence the decision-makers toward operations 
more suited to their extreme beliefs. Hence the conclusion that the increased lethality of 
operations conducted by Al-Qaida was a result of ideological and strategic differences 
among the top leaders of the organization, particularly between the Egyptian and non-
Egyptian members of the group. 
Group dynamics are of importance when looking at Al-Qaida. The organization 
makes rational decisions based cost-benefits analysis. But the organizational approach to 
Al-Qaida’s behavior provides an added insight into the group’s actions. Such things as 
incentives and group dynamics are essential in the decision-making process of the 
organization, and the strategies that are formulated in the achievement of Al-Qaida 
objectives. 
D. EXTERNAL SUPPORT 
 No organization can survive without resources. Whether it is ideological, 
manpower, material, or financial, Al-Qaida depends on support from different sources in 
its worldwide struggle. This section examines the different types of support that Al-Qaida 
received, and continues to receive, from states, organizations, and individuals. 
1. State Support 
 One of the characteristics of new terrorism is that states have a minimal or non-
existent involvement as sponsors of terrorism today. In the case of Al-Qaida many argue 
that Osama bin Laden’s alleged fortune rules out the need for any support from outside 
sources.98 This argument, however, is based on the idea that states and terrorist 
organizations have a reciprocal relationship solely based on financial needs. It ignores the 
 
98 Estimates vary from the $200-$300 million range down to $2 million. Although his share of the Bin 
Laden Construction fortune was closer to the first figure, Osama bin Laden was estimated to have lost a 
significant portion of that amount in business transactions and projects that he pursued in Sudan, as well as 
through assets that were frozen by the U.S. government after the 1998 attacks on the American Embassies 
in Kenya and Tanzania. 
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other tangible and intangible reasons for states to support groups that espouse and carry 
out asymmetric warfare against common enemies. With Al-Qaida, state support is 
existent and essential to the livelihood and success of the organization. 
 The following are connections between nation states and Al-Qaida: (1) states that 
provide safe havens for the organization; (2) nations that provide material and/or 
financial support; (3) countries that provide information to the group; and (4) states that 
make available training facilities and/or trainers to the group.99 
 The most significant support provided to Al-Qaida in the last decade came from 
countries that provided, and continue to provide, safe havens to the organization. These 
countries, even under mounting international pressure,100 allowed Al-Qaida and its 
members to function freely within their borders. More than any other aid from states, 
groups, or individuals, the support provided by Sudan until 1996 and Afghanistan to the 
present day was essential to the survival and growth of the organization.101 
 Al-Qaida transferred its activities to Sudan in 1990. In Sudan, Al-Qaida grew 
significantly. In Sudan, the organization’s ideology and objectives shifted and were 
focused on a jihad against the United States. The first alleged Al-Qaida attacks against 
the United States occurred while the organization was in Sudan.102  As late as the 
Embassy attacks in Africa, bin Laden operatives worked and coordinated missions from 
safe havens in Sudan. During the six years under the protection of the Sudanese 
 
99 Seven nations provide support to Al-Qaida—Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Yemen, Somalia, and 
Chechnya. It can be argued that Somalia and Afghanistan do not meet the common definitions of a state. 
Chechnya is included in this list for simplification purposes because of its status somewhere between a 
group and an independent state. 
100 Sudan ultimately bowed to U.S. pressure and expelled Osama bin Laden in 1996, although elements and 
personnel related to him and Al-Qaida remained in Sudan. 
101 The fluidity of the current situation in Afghanistan could change the importance of that country to the 
survival of Al-Qaida. With the end of the Taliban government in Afghanistan, and therefore the termination 
of support for Al-Qaida within the country, the organization will be forced to seek another haven that 
provides freedom of action. The following are some of the possibilities: Chechnya, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, 
Southern Philippines, or Indonesia. 
102 This includes the following: the 1993 attack (or aid that was provided in the attack) of U.S. military 
forces in Mogadishu (Somalia), the 1993 attack on U.S. forces in Aden (Yemen), the 1993 attack on the 
WTC, the 1994 attempts to bomb bridges and the UN headquarters in New York, the 1994 attempt to 
destroy multiple airliners in flight, the 1994 attempt to assassinate president Clinton in Manila (the 
Philippines), the 1995 attempt to assassinate the Pope in Manila, and the 1996 attack on the U.S. military 
barracks in Dhahran (Saudi Arabia). 
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government, Al-Qaida launched genuine business enterprises.103 These businesses 
granted income in support of the militant activities of the organization, provided a cover 
for the acquisition of explosives and weapons, allowed for the worldwide travel of 
operatives, and made possible the establishment of training facilities within the Sudan.104 
Also important was the aid that was provided by the Sudanese intelligence and military in 
Al-Qaida’s pursuit of non-conventional weapons of mass destruction (discussed below). 
Sudan’s support of Al-Qaida was unquestionable, and one of the primary reasons for the 
success of the organization during the early years of its existence. 
 Afghanistan’s role is central to any discussion of Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaida. 
Not only for its participation in creating and shaping the organization, but also for the 
support that the country (more accurately stated the ruling Taliban government) provided 
Al-Qaida after it left Sudan in 1996.  Just like Sudan was essential in nurturing an infant 
organization, Afghanistan’s support helped in the growth of the institution. With 
complete freedom of movement and little limitations to its activities,105 Al-Qaida 
established numerous training camps within Afghanistan and continued its activities 
worldwide. A clear sign of the vitality of the organization and evidence of Afghani 
support appeared in mid-2001 when a 100-minute videotape displayed the training 
capabilities of the organization (from terrorist training camps in Afghanistan) in a 
recruiting-type rendition of Al-Qaida.106 The efforts by the United States (through 
diplomatic, economic, and military coercion) failed to persuade the Taliban regime to halt 
support for Osama bin Laden and his organization. 
 Not all the lines of support from nations to Al-Qaida are as clear as those that 
emanate form Afghanistan and Sudan. The lines are apparent, however, with two 
 
103 Wadi al-Aqiq (holding company), al-Hijra (construction company), al-Themar al Mubaraka 
(agricultural company), Ladin International (investment company), Taba Investments (investment 
company), Khartoum Tannery (leather company), and Qudarat Transport Company (transportation 
company). 
104 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “The indictment of bin Laden and associates in the bombings of the US 
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.” 
105 The Taliban claimed that Osama bin Laden was in virtual house arrest since 1998 and was prohibited 
from carrying out any actions or statements in support of his political objectives. 
106 Cable News Network, “Video Shows bin Laden urging Muslims To Prepare For Fighting.” 
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traditional supporters of terrorism—Iraq and Iran. Although it is hard to find the 
connectivity between Al-Qaida and these nations’ leadership or decision-making bodies, 
there is evidence to suggest a connection between the organization and individuals or 
institutions within the government.107 
 Arguments against an Al-Qaida cooperation with Iraq stem from what is believed 
to be Osama bin Laden’s distrust of the secular regime of Saddam Hussein and his Ba’ath 
Party. Bin Laden predicted as early as 1988 the future Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and he 
was one of the first individuals to volunteer the service of his battle hardened Arab 
mujahideen in defense of Saudi Arabia after the August 1990 invasion of Kuwait.108 But 
the dictum “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” makes for strange partners and 
pragmatism led Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein to look at each other for support 
against their common struggle against the United States. According to Yossef Bodansky, 
some western officials began to make the Iraqi-Al-Qaida connection “noting that while 
Saddam Hussein lacked the capabilities to strike back at the West, the Islamists did have 
the capabilities and were eager to strike out…cooperation between Saddam Hussein and 
bin Laden would be the best approach for both of them.”109  
 An example of this strategic alliance was the operation against the United States 
Navy at Aden, Yemen (that left 17 sailors dead and the destroyer USS Cole severely 
damaged). The following excerpt explained the possible Iraqi connection to the attack: 
the first technical report came from the US military intelligence team, 
which comes under the command of the Fifth Fleet. This report noted that 
this was such a ‘massive operation’ and was so meticulously planned and 
executed that it would be difficult for any terrorist group to carry out 
without the planning of agencies belonging to countries…accusing finger 
at the Iraqi regime and blame Baghdad for planning the operation to blow 
up the Cole Destroyer…a group of Iraqi officers staying in Yemen 
themselves supervised the logistics and planning of the operation through 
coordination and cooperation with Yemeni military and security circles, 
 
107 There is also evidence of some connections between Al-Qaida and key members of the Royal Saudi 
family. See Bodansky, Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War On America and Reeve, The New Jackals: 
Ramzi Yousef, Osama bin Laden and the Future of Terrorism. 
108 Frontline, “Osama bin Laden v. the U.S.: Edicts and Statements,” Public Broadcasting Service. 
109 Bodansky, p. 360-361. 
 
which for their turn used extremist fundamentalist sides….the plan to 
blow up the destroyer [Cole] was prepared in Baghdad in a meeting 
attended by Qusay Husayn [Saddam Hussein’s son] and the commander of 
the Iraqi forces in Yemen, who was recalled to his country early this 
month [October 2000].110 
Another account also reported on an Iraqi deal with Al-Qaida, where the two parties 
discussed “cooperation and coordination between the Iraqi networks and the cells of the 
Al-Qaida organization…in carrying out a plan to strike at US interests in the Middle East 
in tandem with the escalation of the Palestinian intifadah.”111 
 Iran is another possible player in the state sponsorship game with Al-Qaida. This 
country remains in the list of state sponsors published yearly by the United States 
Department of State.112 Iran has undergone a significant shift in the last decade from the 
primary sponsor of terrorist groups in the Middle East, to a state that seeks to improve its 
relations with western nations. But important elements within the leadership of Iran still 
see the United States as a threat to the existence of the Islamic Republic.113 There is 
evidence to suggests ideological differences between Shi’a dominated Iran and the Sunni 
Islamic extremist groups (such as Al-Qaida) being set aside to deal with the common 
viewed nemesis to their existence—the United States. 
 The links between Iran and Al-Qaida are not clear, but the following selection 
from Bodansky114 shows the Iranian move in the mid 1990s to gain a leadership foothold 
among groups espousing jihad against the west (to include Al-Qaida): 
                                                 
110 R. Alam-al-Din, “Report Cites Sources on Iraq’s Responsibility for ‘USS Cole’ Explosion,” Al-Watan 
al-Arabi (in Arabic), (FBIS Document ID: GMP20001027000147), 27 October 2000. 
111 R. Alam-al-Din, “Saddam Husayn’s Female Spies,” Al-Watan al-Arabi (in Arabic), (FBIS Document 
ID: GMP20010317000181), 16 March 2001. 
112 Patterns of Global Terrorism: 2000, Department of State Publication, Office of the Secretary of State, 
Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., April 2001. 
113 Important interest groups within Iran, such as the Foundation of the Oppressed, provide financial 
resources to extremist groups worldwide. These interest groups are politically powerful in Iran and can 
muster financial resources that account for 14% of the country’s GDP (Lecture by A. Goerishi Ph.D., Naval 
Postgraduate School, 20 November 2001).  
114 It is necessary to take the writing of Bodansky (1999) with a grain of salt. This work references other 
sources to ascertain that the argument of an Iranian-Al-Qaida connection is taken seriously. 
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During 1995, while Iran and other nations sponsored a series of 
spectacular terrorist strikes throughout the Middle East, the Iranians 
thoroughly studied the role of intelligence and the organization of 
intelligence services required for contemporary operations. They also fully 
investigated the question of the human element, in particular theological 
motivation, as it pertained to the new generation of terrorists. Senior 
Iranian officers and officials conducted lengthy discussions with the 
leaders of the Islamic jihadist trends…the results were implemented in the 
first half of 1996 in the most profound change in Iranian intelligence since 
Khomeini’s Islamic Revolution. The establishment of the Hizballah 
International reflected this new direction in state-sponsored international 
terrorism.115 
Recent evidence of an Iranian-Al-Qaida surfaced during the investigation of the 1996 
attack against the United States military barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. According to 
the London Al-Zaman newspaper, “a Pakistani newspaper [revealed] the existence of 
links between fundamentalist Usamah Bin-Ladin…and the Iranian authorities, even 
stretching as far as Lebanese Hizballah…the newspaper Awsaf, which is published in 
Karachi, said the US officials, who are following up the Bin-Ladin case, have obtained 
documents that demonstrate the existence of links between Bin-Ladin and Iranian 
authorities.”116 Information from the USS Cole investigation suggested that Ayatollah 
Khamenei’s personal security service struck a deal with Al-Qaida for an operational 
partnership involving the targeting of American and Jewish interests worldwide.117  
Information regarding Iranian-bin Laden coordination emerged during the trial of 
Al-Qaida members accused of the bombings of the American embassies in East Africa. 
As early as 1991, Al-Qaida leaders talked about the need to unite all Muslims, regardless 
of ideology or belief, against their common enemies. In 1992, Sheikh Nomani (a 
representative from the Iranian government) visited the offices of Al-Qaida in Khartoum, 
Sudan, to discuss cooperation between Iran and bin Laden’s organization. This meeting 
 
115 Bodansky, p. 153. 
116 H. Munsir and Y. Azizi, “Pakistani Information: Bin-Ladin in Contact with Iranian Authorities,” Al-
Zaman (in Arabic), (FBIS Document ID: GMP200101090000599), January 2001. 
117 Ayatollah Khamenei is the spiritual leader of Iran and successor to the leader of the Iranian Revolution 
in 1979—Ayatollah Khomeini. DEBKA File, “Umar Suwayd, Binyamin Avraham, Adi Avitan, and 
Elhanan Tennebaum Handed Over to Bin-Ladin?” DEBKA (in Hebrew), (FBIS Document ID: 
GMP2001011800000617), January 2001. 
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was followed by the departure of a number of Arab mujahideen members of Al-Qaida to 
Hezbollah training camps in southern Lebanon.118  
 State-sponsorship is not just a characteristic of the past, but also a reality of the 
present. The type of state support received by bin Laden’s organization in the 1990s was 
instrumental to the institution’s survival and success. Support of Al-Qaida, however, is 
not limited to nation states. Independent organizations and individuals are also important 
in the support network of bin Laden and his organization. 
2.  Group and Individual Support  
Groups working with Al-Qaida form the backbone of the organization. The 
creation of the Islamic Front for the Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders (that was 
fashioned in 1998 by Osama bin Laden) integrated organizations of strategic importance. 
Close associates of Al-Qaida spelled out in bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa included Gamaa 
Islamiya (Egypt), Egyptian al-Jihad (Egypt), Harakat ul-Ansar (Pakistan), Jamiat -e-
Pakistan (Pakistan), Jihad Movement (Bangladesh), and other smaller groups located in 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Yemen.119  Among these groups the Egyptian connection with 
Al-Qaida was of utmost importance.120 The leader of the Egyptian Al-Jihad organization, 
Ayman al-Zawahri, was a member of the Al-Qaida’s majlis al shura from the onset of the 
organization and recent reports placed his position within Al-Qaida as co-equal to that 
held by Osama bin Laden.121 Also, the founders of the military wing of Gamaa 
Islamiya—Shawqki Al-Islambuli, Rifa’I Taha, Tal’at Fu’ad Qasim, and Mustafa 
 
118 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Southern District of New York Court Reporter’s Office Daily 
Transcripts of the USA v. Usama bin Laden et al trial in the Southern District of New York, Transcript # 
126LBIN1. 
119 The Libyan Fight Group (Libya), Saif Islam Jannubi (Yemen), Talah e Fatah (Egypt), Jamaat e Jihal al 
Sari (Syria), Abu Ali Group (Palestine/Jordan), and Jamaat e Jihad (Eritrea). From the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, Transcript # 126LBIN1.   
120 Members of Al-Qaida talked of Gamaa Islamiya as being “under” Al-Qaida, and Egyptian Jihad as 
being “within” the organization. From the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Transcript # 126LBIN1. 
121 M. Hamdi, “The New Al-Jihad Prepares to Escalate the Violence,” Al-Ahram al-Arabi (in Arabic), 
(FBIS Document ID: GMP20010219000118), 17 February 2001. 
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Hamza—forged a close relationship with Osama bin Laden that was initiated during 
years of fighting jihad against the Soviet Union.122 
  Al-Qaida also maintains relations with important Islamic movements throughout 
the world. The connections tend to be influenced by the link between veterans of the 
Arab mujahideen who fought in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union. In Algeria, for 
example, there are connections between Al-Qaida and the Groupes Islamiques Armés 
(GIA). The last surviving member of the GIA made the following comment regarding ties 
with Al-Qaida: 
There was a relationship with Usamah Bin Ladin and there are many 
Algerian Afghans in his organization. He offered to provide us with 
assistance and the amir of the group Jamal Zetouni asked me to go to 
Sudan and talk to Bin-Ladin and I did. In addition to the financial 
assistance, Bin-Ladin sent many men from his organization to join the 
armed action in Algeria.123  
The same type of connection is seen in Chechnya as Arab mujahideen fight alongside 
Chechen fighters in the conflict against Russia. Buildups of mujahideen forces loyal to 
bin Laden emerged at the outset of the second Chechnya war. A contingent of 400 Arab 
fighters was sent in May 2000 to supplement the “hundreds of Arabs and Afghans [that] 
were sent to Chechnya 1 ½ years ago.”124  The importance of these mujahideen fighters 
within the Chechen forces is stressed in the following excerpt: 
Bin Laden’s mujahideen activated Islamist units that constituted the elite 
strike forces of key Chechen commanders during the [first] war against 
Russia, who are now the leaders in Chechnya. Such forces include the 
soldiers of the Orthodox Caliphs, which served under now president 
Maskhadov; the Abd-al-Qadir Forces, which fought under former vice 
president Shamil Basaev; and the Islamic Liberation Party Forces, which 
 
122 H.H. Diab, “Bin-Ladin Finances the Terrorists Who Have Been Making Threats to Croatia,” Zagreb 
Vecernji List (in Serbo-Croatian), (FBIS Document ID: EUP200101030003053), January 2001. 
123 U. Tazghart, “Sensational Information And Details Revealed For The First Time: Al-Majallah Holds An 
Exclusive Interview With The Last Surviving Founding Member Of The Algerian Armed Islamic Group,” 
Al-Majallah (in Arabic), (FBIS Document ID: GMP20010117000133), 14 January 2001. 
124 Staff Writer, “Bin-Ladin Organization Military Instructor Says Gunmen Sent to Chechnya,” ITAR-TASS, 
(FBIS Document ID: CEP20000829000376), 29 August 2000. 
 
answer to Salam Raduyev, Chechnya’s extremist terrorist in whose 
‘territory’ bin Laden was offered asylum.125 
This Arab mujahideen connection of fighters actively fighting the government (as in 
Algeria and Chechnya) expands the Al-Qaida network beyond terrorist cells scattered 
throughout the world.126 It also provides these fighters with continued experience with 
combat operations against a determined and formidable foe. These elements increase the 
extremism and militant nature of Al-Qaida. 
  Fund raising is important when analyzing the support that is provided to Al-
Qaida. Much of the fund raising done by Muslim groups worldwide is in support of 
ideological, social, and political reasons and not for the purpose of pursuing extremism or 
militancy. Nevertheless, financial resources from organizations and individuals that look 
genuine and non-violent can, and do, end up in the hands of Al-Qaida. Even though some 
of these fund-raising organizations publicly condemn the use of terror, the importance to 
the finance of terrorism is clear. 
These groups and movements carry out the vast majority of political, 
social, cultural, and educational Islamic work, both in the Muslim world 
and among Muslim communities in the West. Therefore, they serve as the 
most important element in creating and preserving the ‘Islamic 
atmosphere’ that is used by more extremist and violent Islamist groups. 
They are in many cases a greenhouse for the emergence of violent groups 
and the preservation of worldviews of hostility toward the West or 
Western culture. The Islamist ‘Terrorist Culture’ can be sketched as a 
pyramid; at the base there is the large-scale activity of the Islamic social 
and non-violent groups: associations, institutes, and projects of all kinds. 
At the head of the pyramid there are the terrorist groups. In the middle 
there are various processes that refine certain social elements into hatred, 
revenge, the search for power and violence. This violence is in many cases 
indirectly financed by innocent elements.127 
                                                 
125 Bodansky, pp. 385-386. 
126 Not limited to Algeria and Chechnya, but also evident in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Yemen, the Philippines 
and Kashmir. 
127 R. Paz, “Middle East Terrorist Groups Use of Western Front Companies To Finance Operations,” 
Herzliyya International Policy Institute for Counterterrorism, (FBIS Document ID: 
GMP20001101000209), 23 October 2000. 
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The connections between Muslim fund-raising activities worldwide and direct financial 
support of Al-Qaida is significant. Bin Laden receives direct donations from wealthy 
individuals in the Middle East, and other clandestine supporters worldwide. Al-Qaida 
also benefits from numerous Muslim activities and institutions scattered throughout the 
Muslim and Western world.128 
 States, groups, and individuals have had, and continue to have, a stake in the type 
of organization into which Al-Qaida developed. Osama bin Laden’s organization is 
dependent on several sources of support. It is not a self-sufficient enterprise. The web and 
the network are large, and the links are solid and necessary for the continued livelihood 
of Al-Qaida. 
 This large web of support equates to a large number of constituents. Therefore, 
Al-Qaida is limited in the nature of activities that it can pursue. A large constituency 
means that players can have an influence in the decision-making process of the 
organization. Al-Qaida must conduct operations that maintain the substantial support 
from the important sectors of the organization’s constituency. As an organization that is 
not self-sufficient, Al-Qaida is bounded by a constituency.129 This limitation is important 
when analyzing the topic of CBRN weapons in the next section because Al-Qaida is 
limited in the weapons that it can use and the types of attacks that it can achieve because 
of the bounds that are placed on the organization by the need to keep its constituency 
together. 
 
128 Noting the importance of these activities worldwide the administration of George W. Bush pushed 
forward in October 2001an active offense against these groups (and individuals) in the attempt to block 
their financial holdings and freeze their money assets worldwide. A similar, albeit less intensive, attempt 
targeting financial holdings was made by the administration of Bill Clinton in 1998. 
129 One might question this idea when considering the magnitude of the September 11, 2001 attacks. But 
recall the numerous celebrations in Palestine the day of the attack. The constituency of Al-Qaida saw the 
attacks in New York and Washington D.C. within the limits of possible action. 
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E. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION130 
The experts’ traditional view of terror attacks resulting in mass casualties is that 
the terrorists’ goals are not enhanced with the greater number of individuals that are 
killed. More important are the numbers of people that are influenced by the acts of 
terror.131 The question arises whether the following selection was made obsolete by the 
September 2001 attacks against the United States: 132 
For the most part killing a few people is as effective for achieving group 
goals as is killing many. It also reflects a technological conservatism: a 
desire to maintain an element of proportionality and willingness to fulfill 
their threats; a fear of reprisals; a concern of possible backlash and decline 
in support by the group’s constituency.133  
 The purpose of this section is to analyze the state of Al-Qaida’s CBRN 
capabilities. After the attacks on the World Trade Center (WTC) and the Pentagon on 11 
September 2001, the barriers that were present against operations that would result in 
massive casualties might have ceased to exist. The 9-11 attacks possibly opened the 
floodgates of greater lethality and the likelihood of CBRN weapons’ use in operations of 
terror. The only limitation now in the use of CBRN weapons is limited to the bounds that 
are placed on Al-Qaida by the constituency that it attempts to satisfy. 
 Decisions on operations by Al-Qaida are done for pragmatic reasons to achieve 
specific goals. Although the achievement of mass casualties is not an end-state, in the 
 
130 The term of weapons of mass destruction is used here in the broadest sense to include not only non 
conventional weapons—chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN)—but also conventional 
weapons that can lead to mass casualties. 
131 Consider, for example, the first case of bio-terror in the United States with the outbreak of Anthrax cases 
in October 2001. Although the number of casualties in this event was minimal (5 killed), the intimidation 
and terror that it produced nation wide was substantial. 
132 In an interview between T. Kuster, Director, Counterterrorism Policy, Department of Defense, 
Washington, D.C., and the author, 20 August 2001, the belief is that the employment of weapons of mass 
destruction, if used, would be limited in nature so as to not lead to a full retaliation by the government. A 
Department of State interview at the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C., with the author, 21 August 2001also echoed the same rational thinking limiting the use 
of WMD by Al-Qaida, but added that if these weapons were used they would be employed at a time and 
place to minimize casualties among Muslims. 
133 G. Cameron, “Multi-track Microproliferation: Lessons from Aum Shimrikyo and Al Qaida,” Center for 
Nonproliferation Studies, 20 June 1999, pp. 278-279. 
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concept of total warfare Al-Qaida is not limited operationally by the prospect of mass 
casualties. Operational decision-making is pragmatic in nature with an eye on the enemy 
and Al-Qaida’s organizational end-states, and the use of CBRN weapons, therefore, 
needs to be looked at from this perspective. 
 Osama bin Laden made two statements during interviews with western journalists 
in 1998 where he stated his desire to seek non-conventional weapons. Bin Laden stated 
his belief in the use of non-conventional weapons as a rational means of total warfare. 
Asked by ABC News correspondent John Miller to clarify whom he believed was the 
target of his fatwa, bin Laden answered in the following manner: 
Each action will solicit a similar reaction. We must use such punishment 
to keep your [United States] evil away from Muslims, Muslim children 
and women. American history does not distinguish between civilians and 
military, and not even women and children. They are the ones who used 
bombs against Nagasaki. Can these bombs distinguish between infants and 
military? America does not have a religion that will prevent it from 
destroying all people.  
Your [United States] situation with Muslims in Palestine is shameful, if 
there is any shame left in America. In the Sabra and Shatilla massacre, a 
cooperation between Zionist and Christian forces, houses were demolished 
over the heads of children. Also, by testimony of relief workers in Iraq, the 
American led sanctions resulted in the death of over 1 million Iraqi 
children. 
All of this was done in the name of American interests. We believe that 
the bigger thieves in the world and the terrorists are the Americans. The 
only way for us to fend off these assaults is to use similar means.134  
More targeted toward the use of CBRN weapons and the alleged acquisition of some of 
these weapons by Al-Qaida, bin Laden responded as follows during a December 1998 
interview with ABC News producer Rahimullah Yousafsai: 
In answer I would say that acquiring weapons for the defense of Muslims 
is a religious duty. To seek to possess the weapons that could counter 
those of the infidels is a religious duty. If I have indeed acquired these 
weapons [chemical/nuclear], then this is an obligation I carried out and I 
 us to do that. And if I seek to acquire these  
134 John Miller, “Talking with Terror’s Banker,” ABC News. 
 
weapons I am carrying out a duty. It would be a sin for Muslims not to try 
to possess the weapons that would prevent the infidels from inflicting 
harm on Muslims. But how we could use these weapons if we possess 
them is up to us.135 
These two statements display Al-Qaida’s intention to seek non-conventional weapons in 
the pursuit of the organization’s objectives. 
 Al-Qaida’s proliferation efforts are a means to achieve finite political objectives. 
The Al-Qaida leadership views these efforts as a defensive measure against an enemy 
that the organization believes has a history of indiscriminate targeting of military and 
civilian targets.136 In the mind of bin Laden and his supporters, the 2001 attack on the 
WTC, besides the obvious symbolic value, can be equated to the attacks of the United 
States against the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. Al-Qaida’s leadership 
believes that an organization that fights a total war against an enemy that is viewed as a 
threat to its existence and way of life should not only acquire, but possibly also use, every 
means available to attain success and achieve survival. In this perception lies the danger 
of Al-Qaida with the use of weapons of mass destruction. Although limited by a 
constituency, if the organization’s leadership views that its survival is at stake (and the 
survival of Muslims worldwide is in danger) the use of all means available becomes a 
viable option. 
 Al-Qaida attempts to acquire a CBRN capability can be traced to the early 1990s 
when the organization was in Sudan. According to an Al-Qaida member, on or about 
1994 there was a coordination meeting between members of Al-Qaida and a Sudanese 
army officer to acquire chemical weapons at the facility of Hilat Koko.137 The attempts in 
Sudan were not limited to chemical weapons, but also expanded into the search for 
nuclear fissile material. At the end of 1993 and the beginning of 1994, Al-Qaida members 
attempted to purchase Uranium with the help of a former Sudanese minister and 
                                                 
135 R. Yousafsai, “Talking with Terror’s Banker,” ABC News 
[http://204.202.137.111/sections/world/DailyNews/transcript_binladen1_981228.html], 17 July 2001. 
136 Cameron, p. 278. 
137 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Transcript # 126LBIN1. 
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opium and heroin were used “
                                                
Sudanese army officer—Lieutenant Colonel Salah Abdel al Mobruk.138 This fissile 
material was believed to have originated from South Africa and Al-Qaida paid $1.5 
million for the transaction.139  
 The endeavors to acquire and/or make CBRN weapons were not limited to the 
organization’s time in Sudan. Al-Qaida attempted to obtain weapons of mass destruction 
while in Afghanistan after 1996. In laboratories in Afghanistan, studies were made on the 
use of toxins, and the weaponization of chemical and biological materials.140 The 
organization pursued the acquisition of VX nerve gas from outside sources.141 While in 
Afghanistan Al-Qaida also sought after fissile nuclear material from nations of the former 
Soviet Union. The connections here emanated from the relationship between Al-Qaida 
and Chechen fighters who had managed to acquire radiological/nuclear material.142  
The attempt to acquire non-conventional weapons was not limited to fissile 
material. Al-Qaida also sought to obtain ready-made nuclear weapons: 
[…] reports indicate that an intelligence service of a European country has 
foiled an attempt to ship nuclear heads to Bin-Ladin and the ruling Taliban 
in Afghanistan. These nuclear heads, estimated at 20, came from nuclear 
arsenals in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and even Russia. The 
reports add that five Turkmenistan nuclear experts were middlemen in this 
deal.143 
A connection exists between the Russian Mafia, smuggling of nuclear weapons, and the 
production of opium and heroin by the Taliban in Afghanistan. Russian intelligence was 
under the belief that the Russian mafia entered into an alliance with the Taliban, where 
in exchange for small nuclear weapons to be used for 
 
138 K. Resch, and M. Osborne, “WMD Terrorism and Usama Bin Laden,” CNS Reports, 
[http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/binladen.htm], 17 July 2001. 
139 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Transcript # 127KBINF. It turned out that the fissile material was a 
hoax and Al-Qaida lost the $1.5 in the transaction. 
140 R. Leshem, “Obvious Danger,” Yedi’ot Aharonot (in Hebrew), (FBIS Document ID: 
GMP20000914000063), 14 July 2000. 
141 Ibid. 
142 T. Avyerinos, “Russia and Illicit Trade,” Elevtherotipia (in Greek), (FBIS Document ID: 
GMP20010202000068), 2 February 2001. 
143 B. Abu-Stit, “Taliban, Bin-Ladin Said Trying To Acquire Nuclear Weapons From Russian Mafia,” Al-
Sharq al-Awsat (in Arabic), (FBIS Document ID: GMP200012250000042), 5 December 2000. 
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terrorist operations against targets in several areas.”144 This links Russian criminal 
elements, drug smuggling in South Asia, and CBRN weapons/materiel acquisition by Al-
Qaida.  
 Al-Qaida worked to acquire CBRN weapons from several sources. If these 
weapons are not currently available to them, Al-Qaida will continue to seek them. 
Additionally, the barriers that once might have limited the use of weapons of mass 
destruction came falling down when the WTC towers were toppled because of the 
magnitude of the event. Augmenting these two variables is the exacerbating factor that 
the Al-Qaida leadership perceives itself to be in a total war where the survival of 
Muslims throughout the world, and the organization, is at stake. One significant 
limitation in the use of CBRN weapons by Al-Qaida might come from the possible 
bounds that are set by the group’s constituency. Osama bin Laden and his organization 
are driven by the support that it receives from various stakeholders. Crossing the line into 
the use of CBRN weapons is a situation that could result in the overwhelming loss of 
support by the organization’s constituency. 
F. CONCLUSION 
 Looking at the ideology and the objectives of Al-Qaida, the discussion focused on 
the driving force behind the movement and the long- and short-term objectives of Al-
Qaida. Osama bin Laden and his organization approach short-term objectives rationally 
from a unique perspective that combines present geopolitical and geostrategic situations 
to grander end-states tied to the organization’s own interpretation of theological dogma. 
 Al-Qaida can be considered a hierarchical organization with a command and 
control structure that centralizes decision-making. Organizationally, Al-Qaida combines a 
transnational organizational design with a hierarchical structure of functional divisions at 
the leadership echelon. At the lower operational echelons of Al-Qaida, the structure is 
similar to the cellular design commonly associated with other terrorist organizations that 




 The idea that state sponsorship of terrorism is an issue of the past is not apparent 
when analyzing Al-Qaida. Without the support Sudan and Afghanistan, among others, Al-
Qaida would have been hard pressed to continue operations worldwide. Also significant 
is the aid and support that the organization receives from other groups and individuals. 
Although the links between the supporters and Al-Qaida are sometimes nebulous and 
hard to decipher, the networks are present, and indeed, key to the continuation of the 
organization. The significance of these numerous support links is that they establish a 
constituency that places an operational bound on the organization. 
 Al-Qaida believes, from an ideological standpoint, in the rightfulness of using 
non-conventional weapons to achieve its objectives. Al-Qaida has pursued, and continues 
to pursue, the acquisition of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. The 
connection between non-conventional weapons and Al-Qaida can be made with the 
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III. CASE STUDY: HEZBOLLAH145 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 Hezbollah is one of the most successful terrorist organizations of the 20th Century. 
Through the use of terror tactics, the Lebanese Hezbollah managed to drive out of 
Lebanon the armies of two western powers—the United States and France. Hezbollah 
also managed to accomplish a feat that has eluded Arab countries for fifty years—
defeating the Israeli military and forcing the pullout of Israel’s army from land that it had 
taken forcefully. Also, albeit indirectly, the tactics of Hezbollah forced an American 
administration into a quagmire between rhetoric and action that ultimately caused the 
U.S. great embarrassment and a loss of legitimacy.146 
 Hezbollah falls within the definition of a traditional terrorist organization. 
Hezbollah is an organization with a clearly hierarchical and a command and control 
structure. It is guided by the clear political goals of resistance against an invading army, 
carrying out militant attacks focused on the armies of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) and 
the South Lebanon Army (SLA). Hezbollah is a terrorist organization substantially 
influenced and supported by state sponsorship from Iran and Syria.  
This chapter continues to question the emergence of new terrorism. It shows that a 
traditional terrorist organization displayed some important elements of new terrorism in 
its early years. More significant, though, this chapter shows the similarities apparent 
when comparing Al-Qaida and Hezbollah. By showing the similarities between the 
premiere new terrorist organization of today—Al-Qaida—and a traditional terrorist 
organization of the 1980s—the Lebanese Hezbollah—one can demonstrate that terrorism 
has changed only marginally over the last 20 years. This chapter is organized to coincide 
used throughout this work to separate the characteristics of  
145 Also known as the Party of God, Islamic Jihad, Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine, 
Organization of the Oppressed on Earth, and the Revolutionary Justice Organization. 
146 Although publicly stating a policy of no-concessions and no-deals with terrorists, the Reagan 
administration ultimately traded military weapons with Iran for some of the hostages held by Hezbollah in 
Lebanon. Once the deal became public it led to the infamous Iran-Contra affair. 
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new terrorism: ideology and objectives, organizational structure, and external support. 
The last section of this chapter deals specifically with the issue of attacks that result in 
mass casualties. 
B. IDEOLOGY AND OBJECTIVES 
For the Lebanese Hezbollah, political goals are clear, terror is used as a means to 
accomplish finite goals, and the achievement of casualties is not an objective in itself. 
Therefore, the ideology and objectives of Hezbollah fall within the characteristics of a 
traditional terrorism. Continuing the argument that questions the emergence of new 
terrorism in the 1990s, the goal in this section is to displays similarities between the 
ideology and objectives of Hezbollah and Al-Qaida. This section looks in particular at the 
circumstances that led to the emergence of the group’s ideology, and the development of 
organizational objectives that changed in response to geopolitical and geostrategic 
realities. 
1. Ideology 
Hezbollah emerged in the spring of 1983 as a result of preconditions and direct 
causes that ultimately mobilized some of the Shi’i minority in Lebanon into militant 
action.147 Providing a comprehensive description of all the factors that led to the 
emergence of Hezbollah in Lebanon is not within the scope of this chapter.148 
Nevertheless, in the development of the group’s ideology there were three issues of 
particular interest. One, the significant influence that a common experience in the Iraqi 
 
147 The terms precondition and direct cause were introduced in Martha Crenshaw, “The Logic of 
Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice,” in Walter Reich (ed.), Origins of 
Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideology, Theologies, States of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1981). A precondition is an element in the environment—in that of the group or those it targets—that 
creates the necessary conditions and/or opportunities where terrorism can flourish. A direct cause is a 
precipitant that, in combination with preconditions, can add to the volatile mixture and lead to acts of 
terrorism. 
148 I refer the reader to Augustus R. Norton, Amal and the Shi’a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1987); Magnus Ranstorp, Hizb’allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western 
Hostage Crisis (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997); and Hala Jaber, Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1997). 
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city of Najaf had on the leadership of Hezbollah. Two, a particular set of events 
instigated the group’s ideology and established the patterns for future extremism. Last, 
the importance of the concept of jihad and martyrdom as a key element of the 
organization’s ideology. 
 Hezbollah’s leadership experience in Najaf was crucial in the establishment of 
close bonds and, ultimately, in the development of the organization’s extremist ideology. 
It was in this Iraqi city that the leaders of Hezbollah first established important 
relationships and created the circumstances for the subsequent development of the Party 
of God’s ideological zeal.   
In the early 1980s there were several groups of radical Shi’i spread throughout 
Lebanon. Ultimately, these separate groups united under the overarching umbrella of 
Hezbollah. All of these Shi’i organizations “could trace their origins to the activities 
during the 1960-70s of the Shi’a religious academies in the south of Iraq most notably in 
the Shi’a shrine city of Najaf.”149 In these decades, before the emergence of Hezbollah, 
the future leaders of the organization received their religious indoctrination in Najaf. It 
was during this time in Iraq that these future Hezbollah leaders were submitted to the 
radical and militant ideology that would consequently drive the organization. 
The importance of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 cannot be 
overemphasized. The connection between the Islamic leaders in Iran and the clerics of 
Hezbollah is essential in understanding the ideological fervor and some of the strategic 
decisions that were made by Hezbollah’s leadership. The period of the 1960s and 1970s 
in Najaf was of the utmost importance here. It was in Najaf between 1964 and 1978 that 
the future leader of the Islamic Revolution—Ayatollah Khomeini—was exiled and began 
to build a revolutionary following. It was in Najaf that Khomeini began to publicly 
denounce the Iranian monarchy and a possible Islamic Revolution.150 Once the regime of 
the shah of Iran was removed in 1979, the Islamic Revolution became an enduring 
example to Lebanese clerics of what “a pious, well-organized, and motivated umma 
 
149 Ranstorp, p. 26. 
150 Ervand Abrahamian, Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic (Berkley, Los Angeles and London: 
University of California Press, 1993), p.11. 
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(Islamic community) could accomplish in the face of oppression and unjustness.”151 The 
commonly shared experience of Iranian and Lebanese clerics in Najaf during the 1960s 
and 1970s was a springboard in the rise of influential individuals and groups in both 
countries. Both the revolutionary spirit of the Iranian Revolution and the radical zeal of 
Hezbollah were launched from a common ground in Southern Iraq. 
In the case of Hezbollah direct causes led to the establishment and growth of the 
organization. Four events preceded the creation of the organization and established the 
impetus for the specific ideology that Hezbollah adopted. Magnus Ranstorp describes 
these four events: 
[F]isrstly, the disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr in Libya in August 
1978 became a focal point for the mobilisation and radicalisation of the 
Shi’a community. Secondly, Israel’s invasion of Southern Lebanon in 
1978, with the consequent loss of Shi’i lives and destruction of their 
homes, revitalized Amal and reinforced the image of Israel as the enemy 
of Islam…[T]hirdly, the establishment of the Shi’a Islamic state in 
Iran…reverberated among the Shi’a community in Lebanon and provided 
them with an effective model for political action…[Lastly], the 1982 
Israeli invasion became a seminal event…[and led] to the proliferation of 
a number of radical and militant Shi’a movements. These groups merged 
into the establishment of a main revolutionary Shi’a movement, the 
[Hezbollah], an organisational umbrella composed of a coalition of radical 
movements under the leadership of a small select group of Najaf-educated 
clergy.152 
The first three direct causes that led to the creation and active militancy of Hezbollah 
were important, but less significant than the last event.  
 The invasion of Lebanon by Israel in 1982 and the consequent long-term 
occupation of Lebanese territory were the significant acts that led to the emergence of 
Hezbollah (and their militant activity that targeted the western powers in general and 
Israel in particular). Within a period of one year, with numerous miscalculations and 
wrong decisions, the IDF went from being perceived as an army of liberation to an army 
of occupation.153 Hala Jaber stated that “the change in attitude occurred slowly as the 
 
151 Norton, p. 56. 
152 Ranstorp, pp. 29-30. 
153 Before the 1982 invasion, open warfare between Amal and the Palestinian Liberation Organization 
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[Shi’i] became aware that Israel was reluctant to leave Lebanon and appeared set on 
staying for a long period of time, despite having achieved its main objective of driving 
the Palestinians from the South.”154 This intrusion of a foreign army set the stage for 
Hezbollah’s potent anti-Israeli and anti-western ideology. The occupation of Shi’i 
communities in Southern Lebanon, and the perception of an armed offensive against the 
population in the region, aided in creating Hezbollah’s radical interpretation of jihad. 
 The ideology of a jihad against “infidel and corrupt armies” of the west in the 
defense, not just of one’s own people but of all Muslims, became the driving force behind 
Hezbollah. Jaber explained the concept of jihad in the eyes of Hezbollah: 
In [Shi’a] Islam, only the Twelfth Imam is permitted to lead an offensive 
jihad and the practice has therefore long been in abeyance. Hezbollah’s 
jihad is defined as a defensive jihad: Islamic law dictates that when land 
has been confiscated or occupied by an outside force, Muslims are obliged 
to participate in armed struggle until the land is retrieved. In carrying out a 
jihad, Hezbollah is also relieving other Muslims of the responsibility to 
join the fight. It is every Muslim’s individual duty, fard ayn, to participate 
in a jihad unless a group like Hezbollah undertakes the struggle on their 
behalf as a collective duty, fard kefaya.155 
The notion of martyrdom was coupled with the concept of jihad.  Martyrdom became an 
important signature element of the organization’s ideological zeal in the accomplishment 
of its objectives (and in the realization of a holy war against the armies of Israel and the 
west). 
 It is easy to relate the concept of martyrdom to Hezbollah. In addition to the 
continuous attacks of martyrdom by Hezbollah against the IDF and SLA forces in 
Southern Lebanon, evident in the memories of many were the suicide car bomb attacks 
on the American and French peacekeeping forces at Beirut in October 1983.156 Hezbollah 
 
(PLO) in southern Lebanon was a keen possibility. During the first weeks of the invasion, Shi’i in the south 
of Lebanon even aided the invading armies in pushing out the PLO. As Norton, p. 86, explains “[i]t is no 
overstatement to claim that many southern Shi’is welcomed the Israeli invasion.” 
154 Jaber, p. 15. 
155 Ibid., p. 87. 
156 The concept of the suicide car bomb was an innovation in terror tactics developed by Hezbollah. 
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managed to combine the ideology of jihad and the spirit of martyrdom into a tactically, 
and some would argue strategically, effective military weapon. For the western mind, the 
concept of martyrdom was complicated, but for the members of Hezbollah the 
connotations were different. This is apparent in the following statement of a Hezbollah 
member: 
You look at it with a Western mentality. You regard it as barbaric and 
unjustified. We, on the other hand, see it as another means of war, but one 
which is also harmonious with our religion and beliefs. Take, for example, 
the Israeli warplane or, better still, the American and British air power in 
the Gulf War. They dropped tons of bombs on their targets. The goal of 
their mission and the outcome of their deeds was to kill and damage 
enemy positions just like us, except our enemy is Israel. The only 
difference is that they had at their disposal state-of-the-art and top-of-the-
range means and weaponry to achieve their aims. We have the minimum 
basics, but that does not bother us because we know that if and when 
required we also have ourselves to sacrifice. They get medals and titles for 
their feats of bravery and victories. We, on the other hand, do not seek 
material rewards, but heavenly ones in the hereafter. But in truth there is 
no difference between their attacks and ours. Both of us have one thing in 
common—to annihilate the enemy. The rest is mere logistics and 
differences in techniques. Whether one attacks by planes or by car bombs 
the objective is the same.157 
This shows an important connection between religion and ideology. This connection 
drove the ideological zeal of Hezbollah and was used as a weapon by the organization in 
the pursuit of jihad and in the accomplishment of organizational objectives. 
The connection between terrorism and religion is not a concept of the 20th 
century.158 The innovation is how Hezbollah managed to use religious ideology 
(particularly the concepts of jihad and martyrdom) to mobilize the fervor of the Lebanese 
population in the pursuit of objectives that were established as a response to strategic and 
 
157 Ibid., pp. 92-93. 
158 According to Simon, The Terrorist Trap: America’s Experience With Terrorism, the origins of terrorism 
can be traced back to the first century A.D. when, during the rule of the Roman Empire, Jewish Zealots and 
Sicariis used violence to achieve revolutionary goals against the ruling empire in Palestine. In the eleventh 
and thirteenth centuries the Order of the Assassins—an offshoot Shi’a Islamic sect established by Hassan 
Sabbah—spread terror and violence throughout the Middle East, and viewed their killings as a holy 
mission. See Laqueur, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction. 
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political circumstances. The ideological zeal of Hezbollah was transformed into rational 
objectives that adjusted to the regional and international environment. 
2. Objectives 
 Hezbollah displayed flexibility in adapting to regional conditions and rearranging 
short-term objectives to deal with the specific geostrategic and geopolitical environment. 
“Essence is one thing and pragmatism is something else…[o]nce within the fray of 
pluralist politics, the agenda of the [Hezbollah] seems less to concern absolutist ventures 
and more a policy of how to improve the life of the mundane and most temporal.”159 
Although wrapped in the veil of theological dogma and grand ideology of good versus 
evil, the short-term objectives of Hezbollah resulted from rational decisions based on the 
group’s perception of reality and the particular needs of the organization. 
 The long-term objectives of the organization remained steadfast from the onset of 
the group in the early 1980s. These were the grand strategic objectives based on 
ideological fervor and religious symbolism. These long-term objectives were summarized 
as follows: (1) to destroy the “Zionist entity;” (2) to ease the oppression and suffering of 
the Islamic community worldwide; (3) to defend Islam against the offense of the United 
States and the Soviet Union; (4) to establish an Islamic state in Lebanon; and (5) to create 
a coordinated and comprehensive movement involving all the revolutionary and 
liberation movements in the world.160 In contrast to these long-term objectives, the 
shorter-term objectives, and the subsequent operational activities of Hezbollah, were 
immersed with pragmatism and an understanding of the regional and international 
political and strategic environment. 
 For example, the first objectives of the organization and the initial activities of 
Hezbollah, which originally brought the institution world recognition, dealt with the 
 
159 Mats Wärn, “Staying the Course: The ‘Lebanonization’ of Hizbullah,” Master thesis, Stockholm 
University, 1999. 
160 The objectives of Hezbollah were first publicly stated in a manifesto that was released on February 
1985. Even the title of the manifesto demonstrated the idea of a grand strategy of defense against 
oppression: Open Letter Addressed by Hizb Allah to the Downtrodden in Lebanon and in the World. The 
full text of the manifesto can be found in Norton, pp. 167-87. 
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presence of foreign western military and non-military activities in Lebanon. Even as late 
as the end of the 1980s, Hezbollah called for the expulsion of “the Americans, the French 
and their allies definitely from Lebanon, putting an end to any colonialist entity on our 
land.”161 This short-term objective was exemplified by the numerous operations against 
the United States and French governments in Lebanon and the Middle East throughout 
the 1980s. Although Hezbollah’s final end-states called for such matters as the 
annihilation of Israel, in reality, the extremist and militant activities of the 1980s dealt 
directly with the short-term perspective of ridding Lebanon from any influential foreign 
presence. 
 The short-term objectives and the operational actions of the organization 
demonstrated the convergence of internal and external influences on Hezbollah. For 
example, the 1983 attacks on the Multinational Forces in Beirut combined the needs of a 
young organization for enhancing and proving its militant ideology in the eyes of 
regional rival groups and the entire Lebanese population, with the geostrategic 
requirements and interests of Syria and Iran. This complicated web of influences, and the 
particular domestic and international aspects of the situation in the Middle East in the 
1980s, was also exemplified by the hostage taking crises that swept Lebanon during this 
period of time. In addition to the specific needs of Iran and Syria, the decision of 
Hezbollah to take western hostages and the continuing struggle of resistance could be 
“seen as an instrument to enhance the movement’s popularity and credibility among the 
Shi’a community in a wider effort to achieve the implementation of an Islamic 
regime.”162 The hostage taking events of the 1980s showed the difficulty in 
differentiating between the immediate objective of expelling foreign influences from 
Lebanon, the particular strategic circumstances in the region, and specific rudiments of 
domestic politics. The objectives of Hezbollah, therefore, were affected by more than 
ideological zeal. The geopolitical and geostrategic environment in which Hezbollah lived 
increasingly affected the short-term objectives of the organization. 
 
161 Institute of Counterterrorism, “An Open Letter: The Hizballah Program,” 
[http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/Hiz_letter.htm], 17 July 2001. 
162 Ranstorp, p. 57. 
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 Another example of a short-term objective for Hezbollah emerged in the late 
1980s. This objective dealt with the need to increase the organization’s survivability and 
the hunt for greater popular support within Lebanon. After years of militancy and 
extremism, the group faced the reality of a complicated domestic political environment 
that was (and continues to be) significantly heterogeneous.163 Pragmatism was further 
instituted as the group was forced to gain a larger constituency in Lebanon to remain 
competitive within the political environment of the country.164 Beyond the continuation 
of militancy, Hezbollah established an extensive and effective social base in Lebanon 
while exploiting political capital for its continuing resistance in the south.165 Remaining 
politically viable and increasing its survivability became an essential objective for 
Hezbollah starting in the late 1980s (and continuing throughout the 1990s). 
 Throughout the life of the organization, Hezbollah showed the flexibility to alter 
short-term objectives within the framework of longer-termed, grander, and more 
ideological end-states. Established under the premise of militancy and the pursuit of anti-
western ideals, Hezbollah was forced to deal with a complicated political situation in 
Lebanon and the changing strategic realties in the region. Although maintaining the 
religious and ideological fervor that inspired activism in the 1980s, Hezbollah saw the 
need to establish itself as a legitimate and genuine political movement for the purposes of 
survival.166 
 
163 The confessional system of government in Lebanon represents the following major divisions of the 
population in the country (in order of representative power within the government): Christian Maronites, 
Muslim Sunni, Muslim Shi’a, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics, Druze, and Armenians. See M.E. Yapp, 
The Near East Since the First World War: A History to 1995 (London and New York: Longman, 1996). 
164Hezbollah successfully participated in the Lebanese elections in 1992 and 1998. 
165 Norton, p. 101. 
166 This issue of survivability became a central argument as the Israeli Army retreated from Southern 
Lebanon in the summer of 2000. The issue of organizational survival became a central element as 
Hezbollah managed to succeed against Israel in Lebanon. The success of Hezbollah eliminated the group’s 
primary raison d’être. And the flexibility of the organization was evident as Hezbollah began to look at the 
Palestinian cause as a new short-term objective for the organization—as seen by the rhetoric and increased 
coordination between Hezbollah and Palestinian groups in Israel. 
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C. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
At the outset, Hezbollah’s organization exhibited qualities that are associated with 
new terrorism. At an early stage, the Party of God had an amorphous and not well 
established organizational structure. Hezbollah did not have a clear hierarchy and could 
be considered an umbrella organization for different subordinate groups. With time, 
however, Hezbollah created a well-designed organizational structure with a clear 
hierarchy 
The organizational structure of Hezbollah has officially been kept a secret 
throughout the history of the group.167 Nevertheless, enough has been written on the 
subject to enable a good understanding of the group’s organization and command and 
control structure.168  
Initially, Hezbollah was an umbrella agency for small groups and individuals that 
had turned to a more extreme and militant interpretation of resistance against the Israeli 
occupation of Southern Lebanon. The first signs of Hezbollah as an organization 
appeared in early 1983. An official resistance movement, the Lebanese National 
Resistance (LNR), under the control of Amal began to slowly separate itself from the 
leadership of Amal in Beirut.169 The LNR espoused a militant and revolutionary 
ideology.170  It was not until 1985, however, that Hezbollah officially announced its 
existence and the creation of its military wing—the Islamic Resistance.  
During the first years of Hezbollah as an organization (after 1985) the Islamic 
Resistance was given an autonomous mandate. The military wing of Hezbollah 
 
167 Jaber, p.119, explains that “the intelligence services [of the West] are still blaming Hezbollah as if it was 
one individual person. This is because no one yet has been able to come up with an accurate list of names 
or a break down as to whom was behind what and how the chain of command actually worked, and no one 
will ever be able to.” 
168 See Ranstorp, Hizb’allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis and Jaber, Hezbollah: 
Born With a Vengeance. 
169 Afwaj al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniya known better by its acronym AMAL. A religious movement that was 
established in 1975 to mobilize the Shi’a community in Lebanon. Although religious at the outset Amal 
eventually turned more secular in nature, and therefore, some of the members began to openly oppose the 
movement. In time Hezbollah and Amal became each other’s most significant immediate threat. See 
Norton (1987) for a comprehensive analysis of Amal. 
170 Jaber, p. 19. 
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performed operations without reliance on the leadership echelon.171 At this stage, 
decision-making in Hezbollah was decentralized. The Party of God’s current secretary-
general, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, later explained the idea of an amorphous organization 
solely held together by the mere glue of ideology: 
The main effort [at the beginning] went into mustering and attracting 
young men and setting up military camps where they could be trained and 
organised into small groups capable of carrying out resistance attacks 
against the occupying force. There were no institutions like now, no large 
organisation or specialised departments. There was only a group effort 
concentrating on two main issues. The first being the banding together of 
young men…the second effort was spreading the word among the people, 
first, in a bid to raise morale, and second to instill in them a sense of 
animosity towards the enemy, coupled with a spirit of resistance in the 
face of the occupying forces. This required us to use a language of 
indoctrination rather than realpolitik.172 
At the beginning, therefore, Hezbollah fit some key characteristics of new 
terrorism (with relation to organizational structure and design). Early in the life of 
Hezbollah, the organization was amorphous, it had an indistinct structure, it did not have 
a clear hierarchy, and decision-making was decentralized. Nevertheless, with time, and 
with the increasing need to better coordinate and control the decisions and the actions of 
the organization, Hezbollah matured into a more hierarchical and more effective 
institution. 
 At the top of Hezbollah, both in organizational structure and importance, was the 
uluma. This group of religious-politico leaders was the driving force behind the 
organization. It was in this group of élites where decision-making was centralized. The 
uluma was also the medium for coordination with outside sources. Magnus Ranstorp 
explained the importance and centrality of the uluma to Hezbollah: 
[T]he central role of the uluma in [Hezbollah] concentrated all authority 
and powers to a small elite clerical group which ensure strict discipline 
and obedience by the followers to the rulings and orders of their religious 
leaders, whose decisions flow from the uluma down the entire community. 
 
171 Jaber, p. 49. 
172 Jaber, pp. 49-50. 
 
In this structure, decisions made by the collective clerical [Hezbollah] 
leadership were reached through consensus and delegated…the manner in 
which a certain act is executed is left to the initiative of these followers 
under the guidance of the alim [Islamic scholar], as they carry out the 
actual reconnaissance and execution of the operation under local 
conditions and as it ensures operational secrecy and 
compartmentalization.173 
 Having a central entity in the decision-making process was important. This centrality 
allowed for a focus of effort. Although cells at the lower echelon of the chain of 
command executed tactical operations, the centrality of a council of leaders allowed for 
operations to be conducted in support of the organization’s overall objectives. 
Furthermore, this centrality provided for a body that coordinated with outside partners—
whether states, organizations, and/or individuals—increasing the effectiveness of the 
group in reaching its objectives. 
 The specifics on the hierarchy of the Party of God are as follows. The uluma head 
the two decision-making bodies of Hezbollah—the majlis al-shura and the majlis al-
karar. The majlis al-shura, composed of 12 religious leaders, is responsible for all 
operational matters and tactical decisions of the organization within Lebanon.174 The 
majlis al-karar is responsible for all the strategic matters of Hezbollah and is composed 
of 12 members including the spiritual leader of the Party of God—currently, Sheikh 
Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah.175 As the operational decision-making body of the 
organization, the majlis al-shura is further divided into functional committees—
ideological, financial, military, political, judicial, informational, special security 
apparatus, and social affairs.176 Jaber provides an added explanation of the hierarchy at 
the top levels of the organization:  
Each member of the [majlis al-shura] has a specific portfolio and is 
expected to implement the council’s decisions in his particular field. The 
[majlis al-shura] itself is divided into two parts: shoura qarrar, the 
                                                 
173 Ranstorp, p. 41. 
174 Norton, p. 101. 
175 Ibid. 
176 Norton, p. 101. 
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decision-making council and shoura tanfeed, the executive council. The 
first body represents the leadership of Hezbollah which makes the 
decisions and the second is the body that executes its directives. The 
executive body, whose numbers vary according to the portfolios, has a 
limited scope of jurisdiction, which allows it and its members to be able to 
act on minor issues without having to refer to the higher council.177 
In 1989, a new council was established within Hezbollah—the Politbureau. The 
Politbureau is a supervisory element composed of 15 clerics in charge of recruitment, 
propaganda, and support services.178 The organizational design of Hezbollah maintains 
flexibility of action, but benefits from the effectiveness and focus of effort created by a 
hierarchy. Overall, decision-making is centralized at the top of Hezbollah while 
operational execution is delegated to the lower echelons of the organization. 
 One last element is addressed regarding organizational design in relation to the 
concept of new terrorism. Some argue that new terrorist organizations, when compared 
with more traditional groups, have a larger number of members—numbered in the 
thousands rather than the tens or hundreds.179 Some estimates place the numbers of actual 
fighters in the militant wing of Hezbollah close to 5,000.180 Others suggest that the high 
numbers in the 1980s have presently decreased to 1,000.181 Magnus Ranstorp states that 
Hezbollah’s “military strength [is] 2,500 in the Biq’a and 1,000 in Beirut but overall the 
movement can muster a standing reserve of over 25,000 men.”182 In other words, the 
argument that traditional terrorist organizations had a limited number of members does 
not hold when analyzing the structure of Hezbollah.  
D. EXTERNAL SUPPORT 
 For Hezbollah, the support that it received from states, particularly Iran and Syria, 
almost became the raison d’être of the organization. The connection was of such 
                                                 
177 Jaber, p. 66. 
178 Ranstorp, p. 42. 
179 Hoffman, “Foreword: Twenty-First Century Terrorism.” 
180 Jaber, p. 147. 
181 FAS Military Analysis Network, “Hezbollah,” [http://www.fas.org], 1 October 2001. 
182 Ranstorp, p. 67. 
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intensity, particularly in the 1980s, that some argued that Hezbollah was a mere proxy for 
Syria and Iran in their attempts to carry out their foreign policies by other, more 
ambiguous, means. The actual influence of Iran and Syria was not to such an extent, but 
the importance of state-support from Iran and Syria to the survival and success of 
Hezbollah cannot be questioned. 
 Keeping in mind the significance of state-sponsorship in the case of Hezbollah, 
and concentrating on the ongoing argument against the emergence of new terrorism, this 
section has the following goal. It shows that although state support was crucial to 
Hezbollah, the organization felt limited by it. To achieve a level of autonomy from state 
sponsorship, the Party of God sought out aid and support from other sources. The growth 
and success of Hezbollah brought with it the need to detach itself from any external 
sources that would limit the decisions and activities of the organization. This concept is 
introduced to challenge the argument of new terrorism that equates the end of the Cold 
War, and the rearrangement of nation-state priorities, with the end of state sponsorship of 
terrorism. For Hezbollah, the decrease in the influence of state-sponsors resulted from 
rational decisions by Hezbollah’s leadership to minimize their attachment from the 
governments of Iran and Syria.  
 Both Iran and Syria had a significant impact on the decision-making process of 
Hezbollah.183 The impact of Iran and Syria varied through time and was dependent on 
particular geostrategic and geopolitical circumstances. However, to see Hezbollah as a 
proxy element of Iran and Syria is erroneous. As Ranstorp mentions, “[Hezbollah] was 
not a monolithic body with total subservience to Iran but rather a coalition of clerics, who 
each had their own views and networks of followers as well as ties to Iran’s clerical 
establishment.”184 The leadership of Hezbollah made decisions based on their own 
requirements and the needs of the organization. To achieve the needed level of autonomy, 
Hezbollah looked for other external sources of support. 
 
183 See Ranstorp, Hizb’allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis (1997) for a 
comprehensive analysis of the impact of Iran and Syria on Hezbollah. 
184 Ranstorp, p. 43. 
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 The establishment of external networks for support and resource acquisition was 
done for pragmatic reasons. Some of the efforts mirrored a characteristic of new 
terrorism—ties with criminal links. Links with other organizations worldwide were 
attempted for no particular ideological reasons. In 1987, an attempt was made to 
coordinate with the Irish Republic Army (IRA). In this particular case, Hezbollah was 
interested in “establishing a working relationship with the IRA through the supply of 
weapons, safe houses, and other assistance for its terrorist networks in Britain.”185 
Another example of Hezbollah seeking resources from criminal links was the 
organization’s involvement in drug trade. Hezbollah leadership encouraged the drug trade 
from hashish and opium that originated from the Biq’a valley (mainly for the financial 
benefits, but justified as a tool to weaken the enemies of Islam).186 The tie between a 
traditional terrorist organization and criminal links was evident in the case of Hezbollah. 
 Money was one of Hezbollah’s most needed resources. In addition to the need for 
financial resources in the continuation of a resistance movement, Hezbollah’s social 
services in southern Lebanon were important measures that the group undertook to build 
a constituency.187 Additionally, besides ideological zeal, Hezbollah succeeded in the 
recruitment of new personnel by the simple strategy of providing members of the 
organization with substantial, tangible financial rewards.188 Therefore, in addition to the 
significant financial resources provided by Iran,189 Hezbollah sought after other avenues 
of financial support.190 In this effort, Hezbollah erected legitimate business corporations 
and established investment portfolios. The following excerpt provides an insight on the 
organization’s business activities: 
 
185 Ibid., p. 170. 
186 Ranstorp, p. 71. 
187 Norton, p. 101. 
188 Augustus R. Norton, “Hizballah of Lebanon: Extremist Ideals vs. Mundane Politics (New York: Council 
of Foreign Relations, 1999), p. 20. 
189 Estimated between $60-80 million per year at the height of Iranian support of Hezbollah in the 1980s as 
stated by Ranstorp, 188. 
190 This is in addition to local sources of financial income. The most important of which is the zakat, or 
alms tax, that is required from every Muslim as a religious obligation according to Jaber, p. 152. 
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Hezbollah has entered into large-scale business operations by opening co-
operative supermarkets in the suburbs and other areas of the country. It 
has revenue coming in from school fees, as well as bookshops, stationers, 
farms, fisheries, factories, and bakeries. It manufactures Islamic clothing, 
which it exports to the expatriate Lebanese Shiite community in Africa, 
the US and South America. The group has also entered the booming 
property market in Lebanon.191 
Also, Hezbollah received a share of financial resources from individuals worldwide that 
were sympathetic to the cause of the organization. Individuals, many of them in the west, 
created venture companies that invested Hezbollah money in stocks and shares of 
commodities.192 Hezbollah managed to build a robust network of activities that provided 
the organization with substantial financial resources. 
 Hezbollah’s need for state-sponsorship was pivotal in the growth and success of 
the organization. Without the extensive support from Iran and Syria, Hezbollah would not 
have achieved the level of success that it accomplished in the last 20 years. However, 
with the level of state sponsorship also came the need to find additional, or even 
alternate, means of external support. To establish independence from a hegemonic 
outside body, the leadership of Hezbollah looked at other sources for support. It 
established business and investment activities worldwide. Hezbollah also linked with 
criminal activities (drug trafficking and coordination with western terrorist organizations) 
to acquire the resources that the organization required. The changes in the type of support 
that the organization received had little to do with a transformation in terrorism per se. 
The organization made changes with regard to external support because of rational 
decisions on how to increase the survivability and effectiveness of the institution.  
E. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 
On 23 October 1983, an explosion rocked the headquarters building of the U.S. 
Marine Battalion Landing Team (BLT) located near the international airport at Beirut, 
Lebanon. After the dust cleared, 241 United States service members laid dead. This 
 
191 Jaber, p. 87. 
192 Ibid. 
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occasion marked at the time the greatest loss of American lives from a single event since 
the Second World War. Indeed, until 11 September 2001, no other terrorist attack had 
resulted in the loss of more American lives. With the use of simple explosives, and the 
tactical innovation of the suicide car bomb, Hezbollah managed to become one of the 
most lethal organizations to espouse tactics of terror. Years before the idea of new 
terrorism came into existence, Hezbollah managed to use religious zeal in the 
achievement of operations that resulted in a large number of casualties. 
Hezbollah attempted auspicious operations, using tactics of terror as a means in 
the achievement of political objectives. The operations were carried out on focused 
targets that were, in the eyes of Hezbollah, justified. For the Party of God these targets 
emerged within the context of a defensive war and, therefore, were not limited in scope 
or by the possibility of mass casualties. 
In a period of a little over 10 years—from 1983 to 1994—Hezbollah 
accomplished acts of terror globally that resulted in over 1400 casualties.193 Behind the 
veil of religion, Hezbollah carried out these attacks, for the most part, on military and 
diplomatic targets in Lebanon.194 Although the resulting casualties were at times massive, 
the underlying goal of the attacks was not the achievement of casualties for its own sake. 
The attacks were carried out on the specific targets for particular political reasons. The 
best example of this was the attack on the U.S. Marine barracks in 1983. Although Iran 
and Syria provided support for this operation, Hezbollah chose the specific target.195 For 
Hezbollah “the MNF barracks [was the] ideal choice: the Marines were military men and, 
in their view, should therefore pay the price for their country’s mistaken military actions 
 
193 These 1400 casualties include 571 people killed and injuries to some 860 individuals. This figure does 
not include attacks by Hezbollah on Israeli Defense Force units or attacks on Northern Israel. In addition, 
this casualty count does not take into consideration the numerous kidnapping incidents of the 1980s. The 
number does not include the 1996 attack on the U.S. barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia (that some believe 
Hezbollah, among others, carried out). The casualty count was gathered from Mickolus, Sandler, and 
Murdock, International Terrorism in the 1980s: A Chronology of Events Volumes I and II and Patterns of 
Global Terrorism: 1992. 
194 Some significant attacks were carried in other locations worldwide. Note the 1983 attack on the U.S. 
Embassy in Kuwait; the 1984 attack on a restaurant in Spain; the 1984 attack on a U.S. business office in 
Denmark; the 1985 Hijacking of TWA 847 in Greece, the 1992 attack on the Israeli Embassy in Argentina; 
and the 1994 attack on the IAMA building in Argentina. 
195 Jaber, p, 80. 
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in Lebanon.”196 The same argument could be made for other Hezbollah operations such 
as the attack on the French paratroopers in 1983 (Lebanon), the attack on the French and 
American Embassies in 1983 (Lebanon), the attack on the U.S. Embassy in 1984 
(Kuwait), the attack on the United States Embassy Annex in 1984 (Lebanon), and the 
attack on the Israeli Embassy in 1992 (Argentina). 
An important element behind the attacks on western and Israeli interests dealt 
with religion. This connection is mentioned here because it can provide an insight into 
the rationality of Hezbollah in the process of establishing targets and the connection to 
mass casualties. Hezbollah used ideology and religion to justify particular attacks (or the 
means by which these attacks were performed). This concept was evident in Hezbollah’s 
justification for the death of Muslims in the achievement of their operations. Mindful of 
the possibility of Muslim deaths, Hezbollah sought after a religious decree that would 
justify such an occurrence. Jaber explained this concept in further detail: 
Torn between their desire to attack…and their Islamic teaching and 
upbringing which condemned the killing of their fellow Muslims, the 
fighters realised that what they needed was not just a military decision, but 
a religious edict, fatwa, from a scholar. While the Quran abhors and 
strongly prohibits the killing of Muslims by fellow Muslims and warns of 
harsh punishments to those who commit such acts, Hezbollah defend their 
case by saying that certain areas in the Quran allow for interpretation and 
thus provide their fighters with scope for action that can be justified 
religiously. Hezbollah’s justification was that any action which constrains 
the enemy and foils their schemes is permissible in Islam, but also requires 
sanctioning by a scholar for it to fall within the Islamic laws.197 
Religion was used by Hezbollah to justify actions. Ultimately, the ends justified the 
means that were used. The process, however, was one of rationality and pragmatism that 
used religion for the purposes of enhancing operational capabilities.  
Hezbollah used the power of religion as a tool within its inventory. It had less to 
do with the hate and fanatism that arguably makes religious terrorist groups of today 
more lethal, volatile, and unpredictable (as Walter Laqueur espoused).198 It was more 
 
196 Jaber, p. 82. 
197 Jaber, p. 89. 
198 Laqueur, “Postmodern Terrorism.” 
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related to the rational use of every means available to carry out operational endeavors. 
This religious justification equated to less limits set on the group with relation to the 
types and numbers of casualties that an attack could achieve. Hence, in the use of religion 
to justify their actions, Hezbollah opened the gates that allowed for greater casualties. 
 This section stressed two points. First, that an organization in the 1980s and early 
1990s carried out operations of significant magnitude—both as risky operations and in 
attacks that were grand in nature. Before the concept of new terrorism emerged, 
Hezbollah achieved operational success with several auspicious attacks (some of which 
resulted in the achievement of mass casualties). Second, this section stressed that the 
achievement of mass casualties was not an end state for Hezbollah. Specific targeting was 
achieved for particular purposes. Ultimately, the means that were used to achieve these 
ends were justified (whether the means resulted in a large number of casualties, or even 
the killing of fellow Muslims). 
F. CONCLUSION 
 This chapter analyzed the ideology and objectives of Hezbollah. It showed how 
the ideology of the group’s leadership was heavily influenced by their common 
experience in Najaf, Iraq. Furthermore, specific events led to the particular ideological 
zeal of the organization. The radical ideology incorporated the concept of jihad, or holy 
war, and the idea of martyrdom in the defense against attacking foreign armies. 
 Hezbollah’s short-term objectives adjusted to the particular geostrategic and/or 
geopolitical conditions in the region. The long-term objectives were auspicious and 
ideologically motivated. The short-term objectives, however, were limited to the specific 
conditions in the region and in the international environment. 
 In its infancy, Hezbollah espoused organizational characteristics of new terrorism. 
In time, however, Hezbollah was shaped and arranged with a clear hierarchy and 
command and control structure. The organization emerged into a centralized decision-
making body that decentralized operational decisions to allow for tactical innovation and 
initiative. 
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 State support for Hezbollah was of utmost importance. However, because of the 
dependence on state support the leadership of Hezbollah looked at other means of 
external aid (to include links with criminal activities). Hezbollah sought alternate means 
of support to separate itself from the control and influence of Iran and Syria. In this 
manner, the leadership of Hezbollah could more easily take decisions and actions that 
suited the organization and not an outside power. Other means of support were sought for 
the purpose of strategic and political survivability. 
 The case study of Hezbollah shows that the idea of mass casualties and auspicious 
operations did not begin with the emergence of new terrorism. Both elements occurred 
with the massive operations that were carried out by Hezbollah in the 1980s and early 
1990s. The operations of Hezbollah did not seek to achieve mass casualties. Hezbollah 
chose specific targets for particular political and/or strategic reasons. At the same time, 
though, the organization was not limited by the possibility of casualties.  
Hezbollah used religious symbols and justifications to acquire operational flexibility and 
to take away any restrictions from the killing of innocent individuals. Although with 
killing not an end in itself, Hezbollah was not limited by the possibility of operations 
resulting in mass casualties. 
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 On 11 September 2001, the United States was attacked in a manner that it had 
never before imagined.199 In a few minutes, the attacks of terror on United States soil 
thrusted the country into a new war on terrorism. But, is the threat itself any different 
today than it was in decades past?  
 At the heart of the matter is the need to understand whether the current threat to 
the United States from international terrorism is significantly different from the threats of 
terrorism that the United States faced in the past. In this frame of reference this work 
looked at two terrorist organizations—the Lebanese Hezbollah and Al-Qaida. 
 This chapter takes the elements identified in the case studies to answer the main 
question behind this work: is there such a thing as new terrorism? This chapter also takes 
a brief look at the lessons that can be deciphered from the manner in which the United 
States handled the threat from Hezbollah in the 1980s. In having found significant 
similarities between the case studies of Al-Qaida and Hezbollah, the lessons learned from 
the actions by the United States against the Hezbollah can lead to better decision-making 
with relation to the threat from Al-Qaida. 
B. IS THERE SUCH A THING AS NEW TERRORISM? 
  In the last years of the 20th Century, noted scholars introduced the idea of new 
terrorism.200  The concept of new terrorism, led by the emergence of Osama bin Laden 
and his Al-Qaida organization, was built on the idea that in the early 1990s (after the end 
of the Cold War) international terrorism was transformed. The world no longer faced a 
threat from organizations that espoused tactics of terror for limited and clear political 
 
199 These attacks are commonly referred to as the “9-11 attacks.” 
200 For example, see Hoffman, “Foreword: Twenty-First Century Terrorism;” Jenkins, Lesser, Hoffman, 
Arquilla, Ronfeldt and Zanini, Countering The New Terrorism; and Laqueur, The New Terrorism: 
Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction. 
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goals, with distinct organizational structures, and primarily sponsored by nation states. 
On the contrary, new terrorist organizations were loosely networked groups, with no 
state-sponsorship, and a final end-state of wanton destruction and death fed by religiously 
motivated apocalyptic beliefs.  
 Three separate categories grouped nine characteristics that scholars associate with 
new terrorism. The category of ideology and objectives included the following 
characteristics: (1) there is little understanding of the goals and objectives; (2) the use of 
terror tactics is done as an end in itself rather than a means toward a political end; and (3) 
the act of wanton killing and destruction is achieved because of religiously driven 
apocalyptic notions.  
 The second category of new terrorism focused on organizational design. Here the 
characteristics were described in the following manner: (1) organizations are amorphous 
and less distinctive; (2) organizations lack a hierarchy and a clear command and control 
structure; (3) groups are transnational in nature and less reliant on particular sanctuaries 
of operation; and (4) organizations have a large number of members. The third category 
of new terrorism concentrated on the concept of external support. The characteristics of 
this category argued that new terrorist organizations (1) do not receive substantial support 
from nation states, and (2) have links to criminal groups and activities. 
1. The Case Study of Al-Qaida 
 The magnitude of the attacks attributed to Al-Qaida in the last decade tends to 
drive individuals to automatically assign the organization a status of a new phenomenon 
in international terrorism. The argument of this work, however, is that Al-Qaida contains 
most of the characteristics of a traditional terrorist organization. The concept of new 
terrorism is challenged by the fact that Al-Qaida (the preeminent new terrorist 
organization of the 1990s and today) does not meet many of the characteristics that 
scholars assign to the concept of new terrorism. 
 In the category of ideology and objectives, Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaida 
organization have clear and pronounced political objectives. Any argument that there is 
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little understanding of the goals and objectives of Al-Qaida disappears when one analyzes 
the fatwas, or religious declarations, that the group began to publicly release in 1996. An 
analysis of Al-Qaida shows that short-term objectives change and display flexibility with 
particular geostrategic and geopolitical developments. Although driven by ideological 
and religious elements, Al-Qaida cannot be considered an organization that pursuits 
violence without a pragmatic and rational analysis of the current situation. 
 This falsifies the idea that Al-Qaida, as a new terrorist organization, has as its 
final end-state merciless killing and destruction. Rather than being driven by apocalyptic 
concepts and end-of-the-world end-states, Al-Qaida’s leadership displays a systematic 
and rational approach in their use of terror to achieve their political ends. Al-Qaida 
targets, although grand in nature, are limited and chosen for particular reasons. Although 
the limits on the group with relation to the achievement of civilian and military casualties 
are not readily apparent, the raison d’être for Al-Qaida is not killing for the sake of 
killing. Al-Qaida does not espouse tactics of terror as an end, but rather, as a means to 
accomplish its political goals. 
 A superficial look at Al-Qaida might lead one see the organization as a loose 
connection of networks with little hierarchy and an amorphous command and control 
structure. A detailed study of Al-Qaida, however, displays an organization with a clear 
command and control structure, and a hierarchy that is unambiguous and strictly adhered 
to at the top levels of the group. Although cells of operatives are spread worldwide and 
some questions can arise regarding their actual links with the leadership of Al-Qaida, the 
top levels of Al-Qaida are thoroughly and significantly involved in the decision-making 
process. The operational and tactical actions are decentralized to the cells performing the 
missions, but organizational decision-making is centralized at the top echelon of Al-
Qaida.  
 The belief is that the traditional ties between terrorist organizations and nation 
states are severed with the emergence of new terrorism. It is suggested that organizations 
such as Al-Qaida do no longer need the support from states because of the magnitude of 
external support that the group receives from individuals and other institutions 
worldwide. A look at the external support that Al-Qaida receives, however, displays that 
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this concept of little-to-no state sponsorship fails to capture the full range of support that 
the organization receives.  
Al-Qaida would have found difficulty to operate and to grow in influence without 
the key support from some states in the Middle East and South Asia. Nations such as 
Afghanistan and Sudan provided safe havens for the organization and its operatives, 
allowing for freedom of movement within their borders. States such as Iraq and Iran 
provided financial, weapons, and training resources to Al-Qaida. Additionally, the 
leadership echelons of some key countries in the Middle East, particularly Pakistan and 
Saudi Arabia, helped in the cause of Al-Qaida by ignoring some activities within their 
borders that ultimately supported the organization. The concept of external support 
provided by states was not something that decreased with the emergence of Al-Qaida. In 
contrast, state support was essential to Al-Qaida’s growth and success. 
  
2. The Case Study of Hezbollah 
The description of Hezbollah as a traditional terrorist organization requires little 
justification. Founded in 1982 and pursuing its more grandiose terror attacks against 
westerners in the 1980s, Hezbollah was operational during the height of the Cold War, 
before the idea of new terrorism surfaced into existence. Hezbollah was an organization 
with a clear hierarchy and command and control structure. It was guided by the 
unambiguous political goals of resistance against an invading army. Additionally, it was 
influenced and supported by state sponsorship from Iran and Syria.  
With the recognition of the Lebanese Hezbollah as a traditional terrorist group, 
the goal in the use of this organization as a case study was twofold. One, continue to 
challenge the emergence of a new type of terrorism in the 1990s by introducing some 
characteristics of Hezbollah that matched elements of new terrorism. Two, show the 
similarities between Hezbollah and Al-Qaida. In doing so, the goal was to display 
continuity in the concept of international terrorism over the last 20 years. 
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 The similarities with Al-Qaida are significant when analyzing Hezbollah. The 
resemblance is evident in the categories of ideology and objectives and organizational 
design. Less apparent, but also visible, are similarities between Hezbollah and Al-Qaida 
with relation to external support. 
 Certain preconditions and direct causes led to the emergence of the organizations 
and their ensuing ideological zeal. For Hezbollah, three particular elements were essential 
in the creation and development of the organization. First, the common experience of 
Hezbollah and Iranian clerics at the city of Najaf, Iraq, during the 1960-70s. Second, the 
combination of four direct causes that pushed Hezbollah into existence and action: (1) the 
disappearance of Amal’s Imam Musa al-Sadr in Libya in August 1978; (2) the Israeli 
invasion of Lebanon in 1978; (3) the establishment of the Shi’i Islamic state in Iran in 
1979; and (4) the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Third, the importance of religion in 
the justification of their ideology and the means that were used to achieve their cause 
(particularly in the use of the concepts of jihad and martyrdom). 
 Hezbollah (and Al-Qaida) both stated and made clear their political objectives. 
Both organizations were established and existed for specific purposes. Although the long-
term objectives of both organizations were ideological and grand in nature, the short-term 
objectives were rational and focused within the specific conditions in the region. 
Hezbollah and Al-Qaida adapted to particular geostrategic and geopolitical situations and 
changed short-term objectives to maximize the group’s success and survivability. 
Hezbollah interpreted its actions, and the use of terror tactics, as a means to achieve its 
goals. As with Al-Qaida, Hezbollah attempted grand operations. The objective, however, 
was not wanton killing and destruction. Missions were limited and focused in the pursuit 
of the organization’s objectives. Religious and ideological connotations were used to 
justify operations that resulted in the death of those that the group considered innocent 
(civilians and Muslims). Therefore, as with Al-Qaida, the leadership of Hezbollah was 
not limited by the possibility of mass casualties or the death of innocent individuals, 
although indiscriminate killing was not an operational objective. 
 In its organizational structure, Hezbollah at first exhibited characteristics of new 
terrorism. Hezbollah’s decision-making was decentralized; there was no clear hierarchy 
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or command and control structure; and the organization was amorphous and described 
better as a loose network of groups joined by a common ideology. In time, however, 
Hezbollah created a structure that allowed the organization to remain flexible, but with a 
hierarchy that focused the efforts and the strategies of the group. Hezbollah ultimately 
organized in a manner similar to Al-Qaida’s current organization.  
 A group of clerics, the uluma (composed of 30 or so members) conducted the 
decision-making of the organization at the strategic level. The uluma, separated under the 
three main leadership bodies—the majlis al-shura, the majlis al-karar, and the 
Politbureau—provided the focus of effort of the organization. Within the majlis al-shura 
there were separations by committees in the likeness of the functional divisions found in 
Al-Qaida (ideological, financial, military, political, judicial, informational, special 
security, and social affairs). At the lowest operational levels decision-making for specific 
missions was decentralized. Similar to the process within Al-Qaida, once the decision 
was made by the leadership to carry out an operation, the individual tactical cells had the 
flexibility to carry out operations as they saw necessary. 
 Differences between Hezbollah and Al-Qaida vis-à-vis state support were 
apparent because of the substantial influence of Iran and Syria on Hezbollah. For 
Hezbollah, the choice to seek out other means of support and to become less dependent 
on state sponsorship was a rational decision made to increase the organization’s 
survivability. The separation by Hezbollah from Iran and Syria was not as a result of a 
change in the type terrorism. The separation from state-sponsorship was an organizational 
choice to increase the group’s effectiveness and survivability. 
 This was evident as the organization sought alternate sources of financial support 
as the geostrategic and geopolitical circumstances shifted in the late 1980s. Hezbollah 
established links with criminal activities (coordinating with the Irish Republican Army 
and involvement in the drug trade). Additionally, legitimate business operations in the 
Middle East, North Africa, and Europe, and investment portfolios in Europe and Asia 
brought with them substantial financial resources. Direct donations from wealthy 
individuals and fund raising organizations in the Middle East and the west also provided 
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resources that aided in the continuation and growth of Hezbollah and helped to detach the 
organization from Iran and Syria. 
The case study of the Party of God made a connection between a traditional 
terrorist organization and Al-Qaida. Both organizations have similar characteristics. The 
similarities are noteworthy and they point to a common type of terrorism throughout the 
lifespan of both organizations. 
C. LESSONS LEARNED 
If the threat itself from international terrorism has not been significantly 
transformed, how should the United States deal with the present threat from Al-Qaida? 
The answer to this question is at the center of the debate as the United States government 
currently seeks to defeat international terrorism after the attacks of 11 September 2001. 
The answer to this question lies in the manner in which the United States dealt with the 
threat posed by Hezbollah in the 1980s.  
By the end of 1985 Hezbollah had managed to perform acts of terrorism that the 
United States had never imagined could have occurred. The American embassy in Beirut 
was devastated by a car bomb attack in April 1983.201 The U.S. and French Multinational 
Forces paid a heavy price in lives with a devastating attack in October 1983. The U.S. 
Embassy Annex in Beirut was attacked in September 1984, and the U.S. Embassy in 
Kuwait was also attacked in 1984. Similar to the operations performed by Al-Qaida the 
targets were focused and limited in nature, but the consequences were significant. Just as 
with Al-Qaida attacks, the casualties were high but justified by the organization with a 
religious ideology of jihad and self-defense. Just like the attacks on 11 September 2001, 
the United States was thrown into a spin of war rhetoric, demonization of the 
perpetrators, and the declaration of ultimatums. 
Analyzing how the United States dealt with the attacks in the 1980s by Hezbollah 
can provide indications as to the perception of terrorist organizations with relation to the 
counterterrorism activities of the United States government. The actions (or inactions) of 
 
201 This was the first time that a diplomatic station of the United States was attacked to such an extent. 
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diplomats tend to descr                                                
the United States led to a continuation of terrorism in the region of the Middle East. 
Furthermore, the president of the United States and his administration were led into a 
circumstance where counterterrorism became the most important foreign policy objective 
for the nation.  
With the attacks by Hezbollah in the early 1980s the United States became deeply 
involved in a terrorist trap.202 As Jeffrey Simon explains:  
[t]he lesson that the Shiite terrorists and their patrons in Iran and Syria 
gained from the Marine barracks bombing was the wide-ranging impact 
that well-timed and well-executed terrorist attack could have. By 
perpetrating a single, major terrorist event, extremists in Lebanon were 
able to affect other nation’s foreign policies. The lesson for [President] 
Reagan and [Secretary of Defense] Weinberger was more personal. They, 
along with other members of the administration, were deeply scarred by 
the deaths of the Marines.203 
An idea of warfare against the terrorist threat was ingrained in the U.S. administration. 
Through rhetoric in the aftermath of the attacks in Beirut, the United States began to see 
the threat from terrorism as a problem that had to be resolved through military means. 
Simon quoted the top counterterrorist official at the U.S. Department of State during the 
first years of the Reagan administration: 
The previous [Reagan] administration, particularly in its early years, used 
far too much rhetoric in describing the battle against terrorists…I think 
there is a tendency in our politics in general to overuse rhetoric. It is a 
more general problem in that Americans, politicians, and sometimes even 
ibe situations as problems. And when you use the  
202 Simon, The Terrorist Trap: America’s Experience With Terrorism, p. 25, introduces the concept of the 
terrorist trap. It is the belief that terrorism can be eradicated or even controlled. Also augmented by the 
belief that we understand what the future might bring by looking at trends in terrorism. In Simon’s words 
the reality of the matter is that terrorism “will not end, for terrorism has proven to be an enduring 
phenomenon for America and the world from the earliest days.” Paul R. Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign 
Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), p. 218, explains a concept similar to the 
terrorist trap in the following manner: “…a central lesson of counterterrorism is that terrorism cannot be 
“defeated”—only reduced, attenuated, and to some degree controlled. Individual terrorists or terrorist 
groups sometimes are defeated; terrorism as a whole never will be. Expectations must be kept realistic. 
Unrealistically high hopes for counterterrorism lead to impatience that in turn leads to sweeping (and thus 
perhaps satisfying) but not necessarily effective measures…such hopes also encourage despair when they 
cannot be achieved. Moreover, unrealistic striving for zero terrorist attacks would be no better for overall 
U.S. foreign policy interests than striving for zero unemployment would be for U.S. economic interests.” 
203 Ibid., p. 178. 
 
word problem you automatically imply a solution. There isn’t a Middle 
East problem, there is a Middle East situation, and there isn’t therefore 
going to be a solution to terrorist problems, there are only going to be 
ways to alleviate them.204 
The United States became engulfed in attempting to use military force against an enemy 
that used asymmetrical means of warfare, that could not always be found, and that was 
involved in a grander (and more politically complicated) geostrategic and geopolitical 
maze. 
 Ultimately, the administration of president Reagan realized that the use of force 
was of limited value because of the particular strategic situation in the region 
(specifically with the involvement of Iran and Syria). The rhetoric of war became an 
empty promise, and the United States government took no substantial military actions 
following the attacks by the Hezbollah that were previously mentioned. The limits of the 
military option were evident as no action was taken even though the United States knew 
the source and location of the perpetrators.205 At the end of the ordeal in the early 1980s, 
the world saw the military forces of the United States redeployed from Beirut. The lasting 
effect on many in the region was of a superpower that could be attacked without fear of 
retaliation, or even defeated and its foreign policy affected by well-planned and executed 
attacks (a legacy that continued throughout the 1990s).206 
 This perception of the United States as a paper tiger led Hezbollah, and the 
regional powers (Iran and Syria), in the path of the hostage-taking spree that swept 
Lebanon in the remainder of the 1980s. Once again the United States used tough rhetoric 
that could not be backed by the use of force, or any other type of coercive diplomacy. 
The inflexibility of the government during the crisis ultimately led to the infamous Iran-
Contra affair. Magnus Ranstorp explains the American position well when he states that 
                                                 
204 Ibid., p. 186. 
205 Interview between an official, Office of Counterterrorism Analysis, Defense Intelligence Agency, 
Washington, D.C., and the author, 21 August 2001. 
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206 The non-retaliation for the destruction of Pan Am 103 over the skies of Scotland in 1988; the retreat of 
U.S. forces from Somalia after the death of 18 U.S. Army personnel in Mogadishu in October 1993; the 
limited attacks against Iraq after the attempted assassination of ex-president George Bush in 1994; the lack 
of retaliation in the 1996 attack on the Air Force barracks in Dhahran (Saudi Arabia), the limited attacks 
against Al-Qaida after the bombings of the U.S. embassies in East Africa in 1998, and the lack of 
retaliation after the 2000 attack of the USS Cole in Aden (Yemen). 
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“…the American approach to the hostage-crisis has been a complete failure in terms of 
deviating from the principle of limited objectives in the crisis and limited means in the 
pursuit of these objectives…the problems for the U.S. policy makers were exacerbated by 
its own creation of unrealistic expectations of what could be achieved given the 
restrictions imposed by the crisis-environment.”207 At the end of the crisis, the 
government was politically weak, and its credibility shattered in the region of the Middle 
East (and even among its western allies). This increased the perception in the region of a 
paper tiger that could be manipulated and influenced by the targeted use of terror. 
 The following paragraphs look at six lessons that can be deciphered from the 
actions (and inactions) of the U.S. leadership in dealing with the attacks and the hostage 
taking events against the United States by Hezbollah in the 1980s. This work introduced 
the concept of the significant similarities between Hezbollah and Al-Qaida, and the 
concept of continuity in the type of terrorism over the life of these two organizations. 
Hence, one can apply the lessons learned from the handling of the conflict with 
Hezbollah to the current situation with Al-Qaida. 
The lessons learned from the attacks by Hezbollah against the United States in the 
early 1980s, and the hostage-taking crises of the 1980s, are as follows. First, the rhetoric 
of war must be lessened or curtailed. This type of rhetoric, as the Reagan administration 
encountered, only leads to the public’s high expectations for an immediate solution to the 
problem of terrorism. But the use of military force and coercive diplomacy is limited 
because of geostrategic and geopolitical constraints. Additionally, the concept of 
terrorism is not something that can be equated to a military campaign and resolved in a 
zero-sum game.208 The war rhetoric leads the country further into the terrorist trap.209  
 
207 Ranstorp, p. 197. 
208 See Ronald D. Crelinsten and Alex P. Schmid, “Western Responses to Terrorism: A Twenty-Five Year 
Balance Sheet,” in Alex P. Schmid and Ronald D. Crelinsten (eds.), Terrorism and Political Violence: 
Special Issue on Western Responses to Terrorism, 4:4, Winter 1992, pp. 315-321, for a discussion on the 
limitations of a “war-footing” against terrorism. 
209 In the words of Pillar, p. 217, “[c]ounterterrorism, even though it shares some attributes with warfare, is 
not accurately represented by the metaphor of a war. Unlike most wars, it has neither a fixed set of enemies 
nor the prospect of coming to closure, be it through a “win” or some other type of denouement. Like the 
cold war, it requires long, patient, persistent effort, but unlike it, it will never conclude with the internal 
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Second, action is imperative. In dealing with the attacks and hostage-taking 
events by Hezbollah, the Reagan administration failed to match rhetoric with action. 
Because of questions regarding the need for absolute evidence behind the attacks, or 
reservations with regard to the possible repercussion of any military activities, the United 
States failed to act. In both cases, this lack of action (in conjunction with the war rhetoric) 
led to the continuation of attacks of terror against the United States and to the significant 
loss of influence and legitimacy in the Middle East.  
Third, have a grander view of the foreign policy objectives of the United States 
during the period of crisis. In both of the situations mentioned above the U.S. leadership 
made decisions that negatively affected the position of the country as perceived by the 
powers in the region of the Middle East. The acts of terror were allowed, through the 
decisions of the United States government, to affect the grander U.S. foreign policy 
concerns worldwide in general, and in the region of the Middle East in particular. 
Subjugating the superpower status of the United States and the grander needs throughout 
the world in reaction to attacks of terror cannot not be allowed, and can only be 
controlled by the combination of rhetoric and actions of the U.S. president during the 
time of crisis.  
Fourth, keep flexibility in dealing with the predicament of terrorism. Simply 
applying the concept of warfare, or maintaining a doctrine of non-concession and no-
deals only limits the types of decisions that can ultimately be made. Counterterrorism 
requires flexibility, and an understanding that all options available should remain in the 
decision-making process.  
Fifth, understand that the issue of terrorism is something that cannot be resolved, 
but only curtailed. The actions that were taken by the Reagan administration were aimed 
at a zero-sum game—either “they” win or “we” win. This only added to the sense of 
limitation in the decisions that could be taken, increased the idea of equating the problem 
of terrorism with a campaign of war, and supplemented the perception of the public that a 
solution to the problem was clear and attainable. At the end, this only increased the 
 
collapse of an opponent. There will be victories and defeats, but not big, tide-turning victories. 
Counterterrorism is a fight and a struggle, but it is not a campaign with a beginning and an end.” 
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impact of the continuing acts of terror, and the perceived inability of the government to 
deal with the problem effectively (as in the case of the hostages). 
Sixth, seek out the root of the problem. In the case of the attacks and the 
kidnappings that were conducted by Hezbollah early in the 1980s, the U.S. administration 
looked at ways to deal with the immediate crisis. After the attacks on the U.S. embassies 
and the Multinational Forces in Beirut, questions arose over force protection measures 
and military retaliation for the actions. After the kidnapping spree throughout the decade 
discussions centered on ways to ensure the return of the hostages and finding the means 
to prevent further kidnapping situations. Crelisten and Schmid classify response options 
as soft-line (addressing the root problems) and hard-line (military retribution and no-
negotiations policy).210 In focusing on the hard line approach, the Reagan administration 
ignored the soft line options, and curtailed the achievement of a long-term solution to the 
problem in the region. In concentrating on the short-term solutions of the situation the 
long-term implications of the actions and the underlying reasons for the problems were 
ignored or not addressed accordingly. 
The lessons learned from the situations that resulted from Hezbollah actions in the 
1980s can be applied directly to the present problem facing by the United States in 
relation to Al-Qaida. The actions that the United States took in the 1980s against 
Hezbollah led to conditions that facilitated further terrorist activity against the United 
States. Additionally, the decisions of the U.S. leadership led to a negative perception of 
the United States in the region of the Middle East. These perceptions only added to the 
continuing fire in the region that was fueled by root problems from where extremism and 
terrorism emerged and expanded. The six lessons learned that were provided above can 
serve as a guide in dealing with the current situation of the United States with relation to 
Al-Qaida. 
 
210 Ibid., p. 309. 
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